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Abstract: The phenomenon of the digitalization of the economy, connected to the fast-
growing globalization, had proven the current international tax system, in terms of 
business income taxation, to be faulty. Designed in the beginning of the 20th century, the 
existing framework is heavily based on the physical presence of companies in a certain 
State and, thus, it is hard to accommodate an efficient taxation of intangible, or virtual, 
goods and services. This misalignment facilitates several aggressive tax planning 
schemes, specially by MGC, as well as a harmful tax competition among jurisdictions, in 
the search for capturing (or maintaining) investments. With that in mind, and especially 
after a raising media exposition of such schemes, the international community is trying 
to find solutions to both the problem of the loss of tax revenues and to the need to (re)align 
taxation with value creation. This study aims at contributing with the current discussions, 
to debate the main proposals posed by the OECD and the EU and, finally, to develop an 
original solution, based on the creation of a ‘virtual permanent establishment’, to be 
globally implemented. 
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Resumo (Portuguese) 
O fenômeno da economia digital, intrinsecamente relacionado ao rápido 
desenvolvimento do processo de globalização, pôs em evidência importantes problemas 
no atual sistema tributário internacional, especialmente em termos do imposto sobre o 
rendimento das pessoas jurídicas, modalidade sobre a qual se irá debruçar o estudo em 
epígrafe.  
Desenvolvida no início do século XX, a estrutura existente baseia-se fortemente 
na presença física de empresas em um determinado Estado e, portanto, apresenta uma 
série de falhas quanto a imposição efetiva do imposto sobre o rendimento diante de bens 
e serviços intangíveis, virtuais, sem que haja, necessariamente, a presença física do 
potencial contribuinte, em forma de um estabelecimento estável.  
Esse desalinhamento facilitou a disseminação de diversos esquemas de 
planeamento fiscal agressivo, especialmente no âmbito das multinacionais e de grupos 
com operações em bens e serviços altamente digitais, como redes sociais, e-commerce, 
cloud computing, mecanismos de busca online, assim como diversos outros modelos de 
negócios. As características da economia digital facilitam, ainda, a maior mobilidade das 
etapas de produção assim como dos ativos, o que tem sido manipulado de forma artificial 
por multinacionais em busca de otimização da carga tributária a nível global. 
Esse contexto é agravado, ainda, pela existência de uma concorrência fiscal 
prejudicial entre Estados na comunidade internacional, os quais constantemente buscam 
pela captura (ou manutenção) de investimentos a partir, por exemplo, do fornecimento de 
alíquotas efetivas cada vez mais baixas.  
Os principais problemas, ou desafios, frutos da economia digital são, portanto, a 
crescente perda de receitas fiscais e a necessidade de (re)alinhamento da tributação com 
a ideia de criação de valor (value creation). 
 Nosso estudo visa contribuir com as atuais discussões e debater as principais 
propostas apresentadas pela OCDE e pela UE para enfrentar os desafios da economia 
digital. Esse objetivo se concretiza, portanto, a partir do desenvolvimento de uma solução 
original, baseada na criação de um "estabelecimento estável virtual", a ser implementada 
globalmente. É parte fundamental do nosso objetivo a apresentação de uma solução que 
seja viável, a curto e médio prazo, de forma que a atual conjuntura das discussões políticas 
sejam levadas em consideração. É ainda de nosso interesse a apresentação de uma solução 
o mais completa possível, de forma a abarcar, para além dos pilares teóricos, questões 
técnicas como os métodos de determinação de rendimentos aos novos estabelecimentos 
estáveis virtuais e as fórmulas para atribuição, entre os Estados da residência e da fonte 
dos direitos de tributar tais rendimentos. 
Para tanto, em primeiro lugar, o estudo apresenta as principais características que 
definem a nova economia digital e alguns dos modelos de negócios, potencializados pelo 
avanço tecnológico e da globalização, característicos do nosso tempo. Compreender os 
elementos da economia digital é importante para que se compreenda a natureza (e as 
fontes) dos desafios a serem enfrentados. 
Além de ser viável, acreditamos que uma sólida proposta deva compreender a 
necessidade, da qual não se pode escapar, da realização de trade-offs (ou ponderação) 
entre os princípios do direito tributário internacional, especialmente desenhados para o 
cenário da economia digital, encapados na chamada ‘Ottawa Framework’. Toda e 
qualquer solução proposta deverá conter opções políticas de valorização de certos 
elementos em detrimento de outros. 
Após considerarmos as propostas da UE e da OCDE e de analisarmos diversas 
opiniões provenientes da academia, acreditamos no desenvolvimento de uma solução que 
se encaixe e adapte o atual modelo (framework), com base nos mesmos elementos de 
conexão já conhecidos pelas autoridades tributárias e pelos contribuintes, nomeadamente, 
as ideias de ‘residência’; ‘fonte’; ‘estabelecimento estável’ e ‘preços de transferência’. 
Os desafios enfrentados são desafios globais e, portanto, uma solução efetiva deve 
também atingir tal dimensão. Assim, consenso torna-se um ponto fulcral para o sucesso 
na implementação de qualquer solução. Consenso, por seu turno, é extremamente difícil 
de ser alcançado fora dos limites do atual framework, ou seja, por meio de uma revolução 
no sistema tributário internacional, de mudanças dos nexos para imposição dos tributos e 
na própria ideia do fim dos impostos sobre o rendimento.  
A opção política dos membros da OECD e da BEPS Inclusive Framework por 
‘adaptação’ ou invés de ‘revolução’ já fora tomada, assim como também pela União 
Europeia. 
Nossa solução, a partir da apresentação da nova modalidade do ‘estabelecimento 
estável virtual’, será capaz de atribuir o direito de tributar aos locais nos quais as 
atividades são desenvolvidas e nos quais as multinacionais obtêm lucros, mesmo que sem 
qualquer (ou com limitada) presença física. A análise da criação de valor a partir dessa 
nova modalidade deverá ser feita apenas através da verificação dos lucros obtidos na 
fonte, sem a consideração direta de elementos como número de usuários ou número de 
contratos celebrados. 
A inclusão de elementos alheios ao ‘rendimento’ para a atribuição do status de 
estabelecimento estável virtual à determinada atividade, conforme proposto por diversos 
atores internacionais, culmina na alteração da natureza do tributo, que pode variar entre 
um imposto sobre receitas brutas ou mesmo impostos indiretos, sobre o consumo.  
Por outro lado, a adoção de elementos estranhos ao rendimento pode, também, 
elevar o risco de se setorizar (ring-fence) demasiadamente as atividades com maior grau 
de ‘digitalização’ o que, em última instância, pode barrar o desenvolvimento tecnológico 
e da economia global, além de evocar tratamentos fiscais completamente distintos para 
semelhantes substratos. 
Mais além, nossa proposta não apenas confere direitos de tributar aos Estados da 
fonte, por outro lado, desenvolvemos um sistema de atribuição proporcional dos direitos 
de tributar entre os Estados da fonte e da residência. Esse sistema permite uma mais 
fidedigna perceção da ligação económica do grupo multinacional com o Estado da fonte 
e a importância do último na criação de valor para o grupo, visto como uma unidade 
internacional. Essa ideia, ademais, nos parece favorecer o alcance do consenso global 
para uma satisfatória implementação, em um curto ou médio espaço de tempo, da nossa 
medida. 
O estudo discute, ainda, questões práticas em termos de implementação da 
medida, com especial menção para as diferentes possibilidades no contexto da União 
Europeia. As consequências da adoção de nossa proposta, especialmente sobre as 
autoridades tributárias e os contribuintes, são também previstas, bem como algumas 
considerações sobre os desafios em relação à consideração de eventuais perdas incorridas 
nos estabelecimentos estáveis virtuais. 
Para a realização do estudo, foi adotada uma metodologia comparativa, conforme 
se pôde observar pelos comentários já tecidos, especialmente com a análise dos pontos 
comuns e divergentes das principais propostas discutidas no âmago da OCDE e da União 
Europeia. Em nosso corte epistemológico, para além da limitação das propostas 
relacionadas com a tributação direta, não analisamos as medidas, domésticas, porventura 
já adotadas em algumas jurisdições. 
Como resultado, esperamos haver entregue um estudo sólido, capaz de acrescentar 
no debate internacional em torno das necessárias mudanças para o enfrentamento, efetivo, 
dos desafios fiscais da economia digital. A falta de uma solução global para as questões 
aqui debatidas ameaçam a sustentabilidade do sistema tributário internacional, a 
soberania fiscal dos países e a criação de barreiras para o desenvolvimento tecnológico e 
para o processo de globalização.  
 A proposta desse estudo, portanto, é de significativa relevância e ultrapassa, 
inclusive, os limites dos estudos sobre o direito fiscal, estendendo-se ao interesse de toda 
a sociedade civil.  
Palavras-chave: Estabelecimento Estável Virtual; Tributação na Economia Digital; 
(Re)Alocação do Direito de Tributar; BEPS; União Europeia; OCDE. 
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Introduction 
 
The digitalization of the economy is responsible for significant worldwide 
transformations in the way business has been conducted and for the consequent growing 
redistribution of value creating activities around the globe. This process is responsible for 
the imposition of a series of political, economic and social challenges, from which, 
nevertheless, we shall focus on the tax challenges of the digital economy. 
 Although these challenges could be observed, more or less, in every field of 
taxation, the limits on the scope of these studies are connected to the analyses on matters 
of direct taxation and, more specifically, related to business income taxes in connection 
with cross-border activities. Currently, this is the area in the field of tax that claims for 
more effective measures to be taken. 
For the purposes of this study, which aims at achieving a global solution for the 
challenges identified, we shall focus our efforts on the analysis of cross-border situations 
covered by double tax treaties (hereinafter, DTT). We, therefore, will base most of our 
commentaries on the wording of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and 
Capital (hereinafter, OECD Model)1, provided it is broadly used on the current global 
web of DTTs. On the other hand, we will not forget to mention aspects also from the UN 
Model2, especially in relation to the ‘service permanent establishment’ (Topic 3.6.4). We 
should leave the and the US Model3 outside the scope of our analysis. 
Finally, in order to understand our object of study, we should first define the limits 
of the scope of ‘business income’. According to the OECD Model, in its Art.7, this 
concept is somehow undefined. It is not our goal to extensively discuss these limits, 
hence, we will assume that it means ‘profits from the carrying on of any business by a 
resident of a Contracting state’, as resumed by Sanghavi4.  
                                                          
1 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Model Tax Convention on Income and 
Capital: condensate version (Paris, France, 2017). 
2 United Nations. United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing 
Countries (New York, USA, 2017).  
3 The Government of the United States of America. United States Model Income Tax Convention 
(Washington D.C, USA, 2016). 
4 Dhruv Sanghavi, Structural Issues in the Income Tax Treaty Network: Towards a Coherent Framework, 
(Enschede, the Netherlands: Ipskamp Printing BV, 2018.), 223-224. 
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The study will be divided in three main parts: ‘Background’ (Part I); ‘Current 
Proposals’ (Part II) and ‘Our Proposal’ (Part III). 
Firstly, we should understand what the ‘digital economy’ is and to briefly discuss 
its main characteristics. It is a necessary step in order to understand the reasons of the 
emerging challenges that we should address. 
These challenges are, indeed, potentialized (or exacerbated) by the new era of the 
digital economy5 and the elements of globalization and intangibility. We know the 
problems. We, on the contrary, do not know exactly the extent of them and, therefore, we 
should come up with a broad and consistent solution, also able to pass the test of the future 
technological developments. 
Two are the main ‘categories’ of challenges identified: the BEPS challenges (base 
erosion and profit shifting) and the need to rethink the international allocation of taxing 
rights among jurisdictions. Each of these challenges will be addressed at the first chapter. 
In order to set the framework with which our proposed solution should deal, it is 
inside the scope of the first part of the study to present the principles contained at the 
‘Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions’6 (hereinafter, Ottawa Framework). These 
principles should serve as a guide during our comments on the new proposal.  
Finally, Part I will be responsible for presenting the core concepts through which 
we believe changes have to be implemented, mainly the concepts of ‘source’; ‘residence’ 
and ‘permanent establishment’ (hereinafter, PE), among other related elements. 
The ideas of ‘source’ and ‘residence’ are key elements on the definition of the 
allocation of taxing rights and have also a significant impact in matters of base erosion 
and profit shifting. Moreover, as we believe in a solution to be taken inside the current 
framework, every attempt to deal with the challenges presented have to include 
considerations upon those concepts. 
                                                          
5 Michael P. Devereux and John Vella, “Debate: Implications of Digitalization for International Corporate 
Tax Reform.” Intertax, 46, 6/7 (2018), 550. 
6 Firstly: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Electronic Commerce: Taxation 
Framework Conditions (Paris, France, 1998). Later and in reference to all the digital economy: 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Implementation of the Ottawa Taxation 
Framework Conditions: the 2003 report (Paris, France, 2003). For an overview on the historical 
development: Marie Sapirie. “Permanent Establishment and the Digital Economy.” Bulletin for 
International Taxation, 72, 4a, Special Issue (2018). 
6 
 
Finally, the ideas of ‘source’ and ‘residence’ are also of fundamental importance 
to the delimitation of the broadness of the concept of permanent establishment, provided 
that the extension of the later usually determines the extension of taxation in the source 
State. For over a century, the idea of PE is, therefore, responsible for capturing the degree 
of ‘materialization’ of the activity of a non-resident in order to set the thresholds for the 
taxation of business income derived from its activities connected to the source State.7 
 As there can be several types of manifestation of the ‘material’ business presence 
from a non-resident in a foreign country, there are several types of permanent 
establishments, every one of them characterized by some peculiarities, but gathered 
around the same general idea. Fixed place of business, agent permanent establishment, 
site of assembling and/or construction are classical examples of what we have just said.  
 Finally, this material presence was not considered enough for creating a bond 
sufficiently string with the source country as to authorize the taxation therein if these 
activities were, in general wording, of a preparatory of auxiliary character. Until not very 
long ago, the ‘digital activities’ were mostly always seen as part of this ‘weak bond’, and, 
therefore, did not use to pose relevant issues. 
 This is not the scenario of the 21st century. Some activities beforehand seeing as 
preparatory or auxiliary are now of core importance to their business models. The need 
of physical/material presence for there to be enough substance of an enterprise in the 
source country has now significantly lowered. The economic model changed. The 
thresholds for taxation of business income must adapt to it8. 
 Part II of the paper will be responsible for presenting some of the ongoing effort, 
at several instances around the world, to tackle the identified challenges. This part will be 
mainly composed by three sessions. At a first moment, we will analyze the proposals in 
discussion at the OECD, especially relevant after the Public Consultation held in Paris, 
in March 20199. 
                                                          
7 The term “physical” has been used by some authors in the same meaning we provide for the expression 
“material”. Ex.: Vishesh Dhuldhoya, “The Future of the Permanent Establishment Concept.” Bulletin for 
International Taxation, 72, 4a, Special Issue (2018), 18 p. 
8 Wolfgang Schön, “Ten Questions about Why and How to Tax the Digitalized Economy.” Bulletin for 
International Taxation, 73, 4/5 (2018), 278.  
9 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Public Consultation Document. Addressing 
the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy (Paris, France, 2019). 
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 Therefore, the work of the OECD Task Force on the Digital Economy, connected 
to the BEPS Inclusive Framework sets possible solutions to be adopted in relation to both 
the present challenges (divided by the Organization into two pillars). We strongly believe 
that the mechanism for implementation of a considerable part of the proposals have to 
include changes in the current PE definition (or its broadness). 
 Secondly, we should turn our attention to some of the ongoing proposals of the 
European Union in relation to ‘taxing the digital economy’. These proposals although 
facing political issues, are in a stage of technicality more developed than the yet incipient 
proposals of the OECD. Besides, also inside the scope of these EU proposals are changes 
in the PE idea. 
 The last part of the paper presents our proposed solution, based on the information 
and experience gathered from the exposed at Part II and with usage of a comparative 
methodology. 
 The main goal of this study, therefore, is to suggest a solution based on the creation 
of a subsidiary type of permanent establishment to the classical ‘fixed place of business’, 
which we will assume to be characterized by the wordings of Article 5(1) of the OECD 
Model Convention. The new type of permanent establishment should be able to ‘capture’ 
not the relevant ‘material’ activity of the non-resident in a source country. We should 
now focus on the idea of ‘significant’ activity (or ‘significant economic presence’10) 
regardless of their physical mass. 
 Hence, this paper will build up an idea based on the need of the inclusion, in the 
tax treaty network, of a concept of ‘virtual’ permanent establishment11. This, we hope, 
will be able to help tackling two of which we believe to be the biggest tax issues countries 
are concerned in this digital world: the (re)thinking about the allocation of taxing rights 
and, therefore, the wealth derived from the business activity around the world, first. 
Secondly, we hope to tackle the enlargement of the use of aggressive tax planning by 
companies, which leads to the phenomenon of the growth of ‘stateless income’. The 
                                                          
10 As will be discussed, this expression appears in several international documents from the OECD and the 
EU, but also in the work of scholars such as: Marcel Olbert and Christoph Pengel. “International Taxation 
in the Digital Economy: Challenge Accepted?” World Tax Journal, No.1 (2017), 3-46 and Vishesh 
Dhuldhoya. “The Future of the Permanent Establishment Concept.” Bulletin for International Taxation, 72, 
4a, Special Issue (2018), 18 p. 
11 This same rationale is defended by Hongler and Pistone. Peter Hongler and Pasquale Pistone, “Blueprints 
for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business Income in the Era of Digital Economy.” IBDF Whitepapers (2015), 
2. 
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proposed multilateral approach should also tackle the undesirable adoption of unilateral 
measures by some jurisdictions that are ultimately leading to one big ‘race to the bottom’ 
of the effective corporate tax rates. 
 Again, hopefully, our solution will help to solve the issue of the ‘where to tax’. 
Questions on the idea of a broader concept for permanent establishments, therefore, will 
not only change some current rules on the allocation of taxing rights, but will also ‘shift’ 
before ‘stateless’ income to a country.   
 By this mean, we believe that the international community is indeed capable of 
reaching consensus (the so dreamed ‘consensus-based solutions’), exactly to the extent 
that countries that may lose some taxing rights (therefore, revenues) by ‘losing’ these 
rights to other jurisdictions, may, as well, ‘gain’ rights upon revenues that were, before, 
lost in time and space for the ‘taxing world’. 
 That is one of the main scopes our proposal: to answer ‘where to tax’. 
 Nevertheless, the study should provide a solution as more comprehensive as 
possible. A ‘partial’ solution, mostly likely, will not have a successful implementation. 
Thus, connected to the idea of the ‘where to tax’, lies the idea of ‘how much to tax’ or, in 
the wording of the fashion nowadays ‘what size of the pie to attribute to a given 
permanent establishment’. 
 This issue is of the greatest relevance and seems to be a fundamental point to be 
discussed in order to help countries in reaching consensus. It is especially true when 
dealing with highly digitalized business, or highly fragmented multinational groups of 
companies (MGC). How to know how much of the revenue obtained by a final product 
can be attributed to jurisdiction A or B in a world where, perhaps, the MGC does not even 
have a physical structure in neither of them? 
 We believe, thus, that the key to the ‘how much’ question lies, if one thinks about 
using the tools already at our disposal, on transfer pricing (TP). The adaptation of the 
guidelines provided by the OECD can help to deal with the attribution of a ‘quantum’ to 
both residence and source countries, connected to the new vision on permanent 
establishments. 
 Of course, on the other direction, one could argue in favor of a complete change 
of settings. Letting go the usage of the traditional nexus, forgetting the old idea of 
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permanent establishment or even putting aside what we have from transfer pricing rules 
and guidelines. Maybe, it could also be de departure point for the development of 
interesting ideas. 
Nevertheless, countries did not opt for this sort of change. Better: for this sort of 
‘revolution’. Since the adoption of the BEPS Project (2013)12 in a more or less 
comprehensive way, countries made a political choice not to revolution the tax system. 
They want changes and that is clear, but they want to use the tools we already have. 
Today, 129 jurisdictions are part of the BEPS inclusive framework13. To propose a 
solution outside of this scenario, now, would culminate in very little practical effect. That 
is not our goal. 
Without further initial considerations, we do hope this work contributes to the 
efforts currently undertaken by the international community, especially on the energies 
connected to the elaboration of a consensus-based solution to be publicly presented by 
the end of 2020, by the OECD.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (Paris, France, 2013). 
13 “Members of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS.” Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, accessed 2019 April 27, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/inclusive-framework-on-beps-
composition.pdf 
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Part I 
Background 
Chapter 1: The Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy 
 
1.1: General features of the digital economy  
 
 The first step towards the presentation of a solution to the contemporary 
challenges of the digital economy is to understand, in fact, what characterizes the new 
business models. Therefore, the OECD Final Report on BEPS Action 1 identifies the 
following key features: mobility; reliance on data and user participation; network effects; 
use of multi-sided business models; tendency towards monopoly or oligopoly and 
volatility.14  
 Surely, as also stated by the work of the OECD, not every feature above may be 
present at every single business model of the digital economy15. Instead, these are the 
features that tend to characterize the economy of the 21th Century in general. As we shall 
discuss ahead, it seems that it is already impossible to ‘ring-fence’ the digital economy 
from the economy itself16 and, thus, these key features tend to become stronger in the 
following years. 
1.1.1: Mobility 
 
 The first aspect that reflects the increasing in mobility in the digital economy is 
the raising in value of intangibles. Nowadays, immaterial property represents a large 
amount of a companies’ value, as represented by the heavier reliance on software, 
royalties, trademarks and other elements17.  
                                                          
14 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 1, 2015 Final Report: Addressing the 
Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (Paris, France, 2015). See: Ana Paula Dourado, Governação Fiscal 
Global (Lisbon, Portugal: Almedina, 2017), 63. Marcel Olbert and Christoph Pengel. “International 
Taxation in the Digital Economy: Challenge Accepted?” World Tax Journal, No.1 (2017), 6-7. 
15 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 1, 2015 Final Report: Addressing the 
Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (Paris, France, 2015). 
16 Michael P. Devereux and John Vella, “Debate: Implications of Digitalization for International Corporate 
Tax Reform.” Intertax, 46, 6/7 (2018), 550. 
17 Films and music are also mentioned by Oddleif Trovik, “Chapter 25: The Allocation of Residual Profits 
from Unique and Valuable IP to Permanent Establishments in Transfer Pricing and Intangibles – US and 
OECD arm’s length distribution of operating profits from IP value chains (IBFD 2019),” IBFD Doctoral 
Series, 45 (2019), 11. 
11 
 
These intangibles can be easily transferred from country to country, especially by 
the ‘reallocation’ of assets between related parties in a MGC. The facility with which 
intangibles move in the current days makes it possible to optimize (for economical and 
tax reasons, for instance) the production by shifting the location of these intangibles to 
lower tax jurisdictions, even for smaller companies acting in a regional or worldwide 
market. 
The mobility, nevertheless, does not operate only with the opportunities for 
shifting the location of intangible assets. Also, the business functions of a company can 
now be more easily fragmented, provided the evolutions in communications and transport 
technologies and the consequent drastic decrease in the cost related to operate more 
complex international activities. Therefore, it is common today that a company, even 
when dealing with physical products, to assembly it in a jurisdiction that may differ from 
both the country of residence of the company and the country where the consumers are 
located. This is easily noticed in e-commerce business models, for instance.18  
A little bit less exacerbated, though, is the mobility of users and consumers19. Of 
course, today, users or consumers from one country can easily purchase something online 
from another jurisdiction, or just purchase while in a trip to another country. It is also 
perceptive that users and consumers, especially in online activities, are able to 
deliberately or not change their real location or simply block this identification by a given 
server from a company. 
Hence, this mobility can also impose challenges to taxation, nevertheless, we are 
more concerned with the first two points of the ‘mobility’ feature. Firstly, because they 
are more generally applicable also to companies operating in a more physical market, 
secondly, because they involve more B2B operations that, for income tax proposes, tend 
to be connected to higher amounts of revenues that could be artificially shifted. Finally, 
is seems clear to us that it is harder to move a hole ‘consumers/users market base’ as they 
tend to be much more fixed than the company’s activities.  
                                                          
18 A. Hemmelrath & E. Wilcox, “Chapter 8: AOA, BEPS, E-Commerce” in “Permanent Establishment” in 
Flux in Practical Problems in European and International Tax Law (the Netherlands: IBFD, 2016), 6. 
19 The fact that users and consumers tend to be more fixed is an argument used for by Devereux and Vella 
in order to shift the object of taxation to the place of the latter or, alternatively, to the place where the 
shareholders (another less mobile element) are located. We are against this approach, as it is going to be 
further detailed in Part III. Michael P. Devereux and John Vella, “Debate: Implications of Digitalization 
for International Corporate Tax Reform.” Intertax, 46, 6/7 (2018), 550. 
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1.1.2: Reliance on data and user participation 
 
 Reliance on data and information and user participation were always present in 
the business activity and, therefore, do not represent a novelty from the digital economy. 
Nevertheless, as happened with the feature of ‘mobility’, briefly analyzed above, the 
digitalization of the economy provided for an entire new way of dealing with data and 
user participation. 
 Nowadays, companies are able to collect a much higher amount of data from users 
and consumers. This increase in the facility and in the amount of data lead it to become 
not simply a sided element for the business activity, but for it to be actually a core element 
for it. The reliance on data can be expressed either by the huge amount of value it can 
generate for companies interested in selling it or, on the other hand, because with the 
‘reading’ (processing) of these data, companies are able to ‘outsource’ to consumers and 
users some functions of the business activities, like quality control or product 
description.20 
 Ultimately, this feature reinforces the idea of the process of dematerialization of 
the economy. 
1.1.3: Network effects 
 
 Connected to the idea of user participation lies the feature of the network effect, 
potentialized by the digital economy. Therefore, it is clear that in some business models, 
products can increase their value depending on the number of users or consumers to that 
specific product. The classical example to this effect is the fax machine21, in the sense 
that the product would be useless if only one user acquires it.  
 Today, other important examples can be pointed out, like the use of more 
disseminated software or social media. On the other hand, also platforms that offers 
transports or accommodation services, performed by third and independent parties relies, 
usually, on the existence of several users sharing their experiences and encouraging or 
                                                          
20 In this regard, we found interesting the intervention of Dhruv Sanghavi during the Public Consultation 
event on the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy, held by the OECD, in Paris, March 2019. 
This intervention can be watched at https://oecdtv.webtv-solution.com/5524/or/Public-Consultation-Tax-
Challenges-of-Digitalisation.html, accessed 2019 July 16. 
21 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 1, 2015 Final Report: Addressing the 
Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (Paris, France, 2015), 71. 
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discouraging others to acquire the given products or services, without an exact 
compensation for that. 
 The network effect, therefore, is responsible for creating the so-called 
‘externalities’, that may, then, be either positive or negative.  
 Finally, thou, we must understand that this feature of the digital economy is more 
closely connected to B2C operations, but, of course, not exclusively so. 
1.1.4: Use of multi-sided business models 
 
 The digital economy enables a broader usage of the multi-sided model strategy, 
where different ‘parts’ or ‘components’ of a given business can be located in different 
jurisdictions and even provided by different undertakers. Hence, the same idea of positive 
and negative externalities analyzed in the topic above (1.1.3) applies to this feature.  
 This can be easily exemplified by the great number of internet free online news 
websites, social medias, virtual games and others that have the investment made upon 
them covered by the selling of advertisement space to be view by the ultimate user of the 
given online product. The externality verified here is usually a positive one, where 
business can split the costs of an investment and where consumers can have free access 
to the products desired. 
 On the other hand, negative externality can derive when the provider of the ‘free 
service’ collects and distributes data of the users in an illegal way. 
 This feature is also closely connected to the idea of the increase in business 
mobility (1.1.1), provided that also the placement of the sides of the business in 
jurisdiction A or B can easily be determined by economical and tax reasons, with fewer 
material barriers than ever before. 
1.1.5: Tendency towards monopoly or oligopoly 
 
 A combination of several of the features above, especially in connection to the 
raise of importance of the network effect and the importance given to innovation and 
creation of new technologies, tends to lead to a monopoly or oligopoly in several markets. 
 Once a new product is made available at the market and quickly reaches a 
significant number of users (software, social media, mobile application for several 
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purposes, etc.) other users tend to look for the same product, instead of a possible 
competitor, given that they could extract a higher value from their usage of the main 
market player (lower prices, more inputs from other users, more connectivity with other 
products, etc). 
 This, therefore, creates barriers to the entrance of new players in the same market, 
but, on the opposite direction, it also seems to create an incentive for the development of 
new products which could be seen as better alternatives for the so far dominant in the 
market. Thus, new products can also reach their position in the market and grow 
extremely fast in a short time.  
1.1.6:  Volatility 
 
 Finally, as a natural consequence of technological development, several 
companies in a dominant market position lose their monopoly in a relatively short time, 
provided that new and more efficient products are being developed in a faster way all 
around the world.  
1.2: The process of (re)allocation of business activities and taxing rights 
 
 The globalization and the development of the digital economy are responsible for 
a complete change in the organization of the economic activity around the world. All the 
elements described at topic 1.1 above contribute to the reallocation of business activities 
among a wide-ranging of jurisdictions, therefore, shifting the performance of activities 
from certain traditional countries to others, especially emerging countries, countries with 
a big potential market or even to low-tax jurisdictions.  
 Imagine, for instance, a business model where the company of a certain digital 
service is incorporated in Germany, but, due to the technological facilities available and 
tax and economic opportunities, decided to move its software and engineers to Ireland 
and, from there, to offer products to users/consumers in India, from whom the company 
extracts, processes, uses and resells valuable data to other companies interested. 
 This example shows how the process of generating business revenue can be 
complex and spread between several jurisdictions. Therefore, it is crucial to understand 
that the new organization of the economic features around the international community 
has posed questions on the need to rebalance the taxing rights derived from these 
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relocated activities or, in the terminology adopted by De Wilde: the need to rethink the 
way states divide the ‘international tax pie’.22 
 We thus believe that the dynamic of the international taxation should be adapted 
in order to adequately reflects taxation where value is created. Nevertheless, it is not only 
sufficient to identify that a given value is created in a certain country. It is also needed to 
determine how much of value is effectively being created and if that the particular nature 
of value creation should be subject to income taxation therein. 
 These issues will be addressed at Chapter 5, provided that any adopted theory on 
how to deal with the new framework of value creation should be reflected in the new 
thresholds for the configuration of a permanent establishment, capable of ‘capturing’ this 
value creation and translating it into a taxable presence in the country where it is being 
generated.   
1.3: The BEPS phenomenon  
 
 Another considerable tax challenge of the digital economy is to fight the base 
erosion and profit shifting phenomenon, also extensively addressed by the OECD, 
especially since the launching of the BEPS Project, in 201323, related to direct taxation. 
Again, the features presented at Topic 1.1 are responsible for increasing the opportunities 
for aggressive tax planning and the consequent artificial rearrangement of business 
activities, specially by MGC, in order to avoid or significantly reduce income taxation at 
a global level.   
 The OECD BEPS Action Plan identified 15 points that should be addressed by the 
international community in order for there to be the conservation of a global income tax 
base, in contrast with a scenario where large multinational companies are paying just a 
                                                          
22 Maarten de Wilde, “Some Thoughts on a Fair Allocation of Corporate Tax in a Globalizing Economy.” 
Intertax, 38, 5 (2010), 281. 
23 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (Paris, France, 2013). 
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small fraction of the tax they are expected to pay24. It is a matter of tax sustainability, as 
we defend25.  
 Understanding this project is crucial to comprehend the political framework at 
which our proposal of a new ‘virtual permanent establishment’ should be located. 
Therefore, we begin by saying that the OCDE, together with the G20, opted for a project 
to ‘fix the current framework’ instead of one that could ultimately modify the very core 
of the system. 
 With that in mind, we have to conclude that, in a short to mid-term, the solution 
for the tax challenges of the digital economy should comprehend the maintenance of 
direct taxes on business income26. Therefore, it seems that the idea of permanent 
establishment, as it is going to be discussed ahead, should continue been of significant 
importance to cross-border taxation. 
 For the purpose of this study, we will consider mostly Action 1 (Digital 
Economy); Action 7 (Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment 
Status); Actions 8-10 (Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation) and 
Action 15 (Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to 
Prevent BEPS)27. Both the first and the last actions are view by the OECD as transversal 
measures and, hence, influences directly all situations addressed by the Plan. Our 
proposed solution, therefore, should be able to tackle the challenges of the digital 
economy and to be implemented in a global (multilateral) level. 
                                                          
24 See commonly debated cases such as: FIAT (EU Commission Case No. SA38375); Starbucks (EU 
Commission Case No. SA.38374); Apple (EU Commission Case No. SA.38373) and Amazon (EU 
Commission Case No. SA.38944). 
25 Ricardo S. Schmitz F., “The challenges of sovereignty, justice and representation related to the movement 
towards multilateralism in international taxation,” paper presented at the 29th IVR World Congress, 
Lucerne, Switzerland, July 2019. 
26 It is interesting to notice that some scholars advocate in the sense that direct taxation is incompatible with 
the digital economy and that efforts should be taken to substitute it, in a global level, by a broader 
application of indirect taxes such as the VAT. Noticeable, because of the characteristics of the VAT, this 
type of tax is better adaptable to the challenges of the digital economy and it has been already a target of 
interesting and successful experiences, namely at the European Union. Moreover, even today, indirect taxes 
respond, in general, for a bigger portion of tax revenues in many jurisdictions. Nevertheless, countries are 
not politically willing to give up on direct taxes and, therefore, a practical solution to the challenges faced, 
as we believe, most follow that ‘political agreement’ made around the BEPS Project and the so-called BEPS 
Inclusive Framework, with all non-OECD G20 members together. Finally, the adopted solution may also 
be able to reestablish a balance between state revenues deriving from indirect and direct taxation, with the 
increase in the effective collection of the latter in a global level.      
27 An overview of the BEPS Actions and the documents related to them can be found at: 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-actions.htm, accessed 2019 April 20. 
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1.3.1: Action 1 (Digital Economy) 
 
 After the presentation of the Final Report on BEPS Action 128, the G20 and the 
BEPS Inclusive Framework renewed the mandate of the Task Force on the Digital 
Economy, due to the fact that Action 1 did not provide for a concrete measure to be 
implemented29. This new mandate shall culminate in the presentation of a ‘consensus-
based solution’ to be published by the end of 202030.  
Recently, the Task Force on the Digital Economy has published an Interim 
Report31 (2018) as well as a Public Consultation (2019) in order to reach a consensus-
based solution on how to address the tax challenges of the digital economy. The latter, by 
the way, received several inputs from both taxpayers and tax authorities, as well as from 
other stakeholders and these inputs, to some extent, will be confronted ahead at this study. 
 These discussions are taken not only in related to fighting BEPS, but also in related 
to what OECD calls the ‘broader’ tax challenges – namely connected to the issue on the 
(re)allocation of taxing rights. Surely, these two sets of challenges are connected to the 
extent that the recovering of tax revenues, expected from the successful implementation 
of the BEPS Plan, leads to questions on where to allocate the recovered revenue among 
jurisdictions.  
1.3.2: Action 7 (Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent 
Establishment Status) 
 
 The Action on Permanent Establishment promoted a series of changes at both the 
wording and, mainly, the commentaries to the OECD Model Convention in order to fight 
the artificial avoidance of the constitution of a permanent establishment. In due course, 
this artificial avoidance also represents the ‘escaping’ of a taxable presence in a given 
jurisdiction. 
                                                          
28 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 1, 2015 Final Report: Addressing the 
Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (Paris, France, 2015). 
29 Aleksandra Bal, “(Mis)guided by the Value Creation Principle – Can New Concepts Solve Old 
Problems.” Bulletin for International Taxation, 72, 11 (2018): 6 p. 
30 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Public Consultation Document. Addressing 
the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy (Paris, France, 2019). 
31 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Tax Challenges Arrising from 
Digitalisation. Interim Report, Inclusive Framework on BEPS (Paris, France, 2018). 
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 Therefore, the work of the OECD, especially until the publication of the Final 
Report on Action 732, in 2015, focused on trying to tackle issues related to the artificial 
avoidance of the permanent establishment status by the use of intermediaries performing 
certain activities, especially by means of an artificial fragmentation of cohesive operating 
business. 
Besides that, Action 7 also provided for a revision in the exceptions applicable for 
the constitution of a PE, by reducing the scope of the terms ‘preparatory’ and ‘auxiliary’ 
activities, mainly through changes in the commentaries of Art.5 of the Model Convention. 
Changes on Art.5(5) and the scope of the application of the concept of ‘dependent agent’ 
were also introduced.33 
 Although we believe in interesting upcoming results from the adoption of the 
measures from Action 7, it is a fact that the OECD has a lot to work on the concept of 
permanent establishment. Firstly, with a stronger effort in broadening the idea of PE and 
adding a ‘virtual’ presence threshold but, apart from that, it is clear that companies can 
now create formal PEs with very limited risk, asset and functions that do not correspond 
with the income connected to the activities developed. The OECD should also take that 
it into account.  
1.3.3: Actions 8-10 (Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value 
Creation) 
 
The goal of Actions 8-10 of the BEPS Project is to align the transfer pricing 
outcomes with the already mentioned idea of value creation. Therefore, the investigation 
carried out by the OECD in matters of transfer pricing is, as stated above, intrinsically 
connected to the idea of permanent establishment. 
Due to the evolution of the features of the digital economy, the Actions in evidence 
focus mainly in transfer pricing issues related to HTVI (hard to value intangibles); 
contractual arrangements for reallocating risks and profits and funding inside MGC 
(financial activities). Issues on business restructuring seem also important in relation to 
the scope of Actions 8-10. 
                                                          
32 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of 
Permanent Establishment Status, Action 7 - 2015 Final Report (Paris, France, 2015). 
33 Ana Paula Dourado, “Editorial: Is There a Light at the End of the Tunnel of the International Tax 
System?” Intertax, 46, 8/9 (2018), 607. 
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As we should discuss when dealing with the ongoing proposals designed by the 
Task Force on the Digital Economy, there are quite reasonable possibilities from which 
the application of transfer pricing rules would be set aside, giving space for a ‘residual 
profit slit method’. The OECD itself, especially when developing the proposals discussed 
at the Public Consultation, in Paris, March 2019, opened the possibilities for the 
substitution of the arm’s length principle34, which was, by the publication of the Final 
Report on Actions 8-10 of the BEPS project, a ‘hard nucleus’ for international taxation 
of MGC.35 
Several scholars, as we are going to discuss further ahead, questions the suitability 
of transfer pricing / arm’s length ideas in the current scenario of the digital economy. For 
instance, Ana Paula Dourado discuss about the existence of several financial schemes that 
would not be performed among independent companies, such as cash pooling36. 
It is interesting, thus, to highlight the certain dubious view of the OECD upon this 
subject and its uncertain next steps. Therefore, although it is not inside the scope of this 
section of our study, it is also relevant to question what will be the future of the worked 
carried out (and delivered) by Actions 8-10. 
1.3.4: Action 15 (Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related 
Measures to Prevent BEPS) 
 
 We should now make some comments on Action 15. 
Firstly, the practical feasibility of this Action was putted in doubt by many tax 
experts by the time of the release of the BEPS Action Plan, in 2013. Nevertheless, after 
the publication of the Final Report37, in 2016, a mandate was issued for the OECD to 
carry-on the work towards the actual implementation of such a multilateral instrument 
(MLI).  
                                                          
34 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Public Consultation Document. Addressing 
the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy (Paris, France, 2019). 
35 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with 
Value Creation: Actions 8-10: 2015 Final Reports (Paris, France, 2015). 
36 Ana Paula Dourado, “Editorial: The OECD Financial Transactions Discussion Draft and BEPS Actions 
8-10.” Intertax, 46, 10 (2018), 740.  
37 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to 
Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties, Action 15 - 2015 Final Report (Paris, France, 2015). 
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 Thus, in a surprisingly short period of time, the MLI was adopted (2016)38 and 
has now been signed for already 87 jurisdictions39. For some of the countries, the MLI 
entered into force in the 1st of July 2018, while we still wait for the majority of countries 
to actually implement it, what can that longer depending on the necessary legal 
procedures to be domestically adopted by them.  
 Currently, the importance of the MLI lies, essentially, in the symbolism it brings 
in the sense that it is actually possible for countries to gather together in global tax 
solutions, acting in consensus. Nevertheless, the stage of development of the MLI is still 
very early and needs to be improved. By now, countries are only ‘obliged’ to comply with 
minimum standards, with the possible adoption of several reservations to the full 
application of the multilateral instrument (by ways of opts-in and opts-out). 
 Besides that, the MLI carried the idea of bringing a higher level of global 
harmonization to the web of bilateral tax treaties. This would help dealing with the 
practice of harmful tax competition40 among countries and, more than that, would help in 
the implementation of more standardized solutions, helping with compliance and 
administration. 
 The problem is that both the ‘low scope’ of the minimum standards and the high 
number of possible reservations that can be applied differently in every specific bilateral 
treaty, makes the MLI still a ‘shy instrument’. 
 On the other hand, as we are going to further develop, we do believe that the MLI 
is the right instrument for the implementation of our proposed idea and that it contains a 
great potential that must be explored. 
 
 
                                                          
38 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax 
Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Paris, France, 2016). 
39 This data is updated until 2019 April 20. For updated numbers: http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-
mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf. 
40 In terms of defining what would be considered a ‘harmful tax competition’ we adopt the considerations 
brought by Maarten de Wilde, according to whom the this form of competition would be more connected 
to the artificial shift of business activities, for tax reasons, while a fair tax competition would deal with the 
attraction of real business activities. Maarten de Wilde, “Tax Competition within the European Union – Is 
the CCCTB Directive a Solution?” Erasmus Law Review, 24, 1 (2014), 26.  
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Chapter 2: Ottawa Framework for International Taxation in the Digital 
Economy 
 
 The first step towards the elaboration of a new consensus-based solution for the 
challenges of the digitalization of the economy must be the identification that changes 
perpetrated inside the web of tax treaties around the world, as we suggest that must be 
done, tend to cause relevant implications at the level of the current framework for 
international taxation.  
 So far, we do not believe on the possibility of developing a solution without 
affecting the practical application of the principles of international tax law. Therefore, a 
responsible solution to these challenges must consider (and balance) the effects upon 
them.  
 By means of this study, we shall adopt the so called ‘Ottawa principles’ or ‘Ottawa 
Framework’. These principles were elaborated by the work of the OECD and were 
embodied firstly at the ‘Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions’ (1998)41 and in the 
following  ‘Implementation of the Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions’ (2003)42, 
both in regard to e-commerce and, later, in 2015, at the Final Report on BEPS Action 1: 
‘Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy’43, connected to the whole 
international taxation in a digitalized world. 
 As stated right at the introduction to this paper, we aim at achieving a practical 
and feasible solution to our problem. In our understanding, therefore, the adoption of new 
principles or the performance of substantial changes on the existing framework would 
require a much higher effort from the international community and would probably fail 
to be a consensus, at least in a short-term analysis.44 
                                                          
41 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Electronic Commerce: Taxation Framework 
Conditions (Paris, France, 1998), 4.  
42 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Implementation of the Ottawa Taxation 
Framework Conditions: the 2003 report (Paris, France, 2003). 
43 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 1, 2015 Final Report: Addressing the 
Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (Paris, France, 2015), 20-21. 
44 The Task Force for the Digital Economy of the International Bureau for Fiscal Affairs (IFBD) expressed 
the same opinion in its comments to the Public Consultation held in Paris, 2019 March, by the OECD. 
Pasquale Pistone; João Félix Pinto Nogueira and Betty Andrade. “Comments submitted by The 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) Task Force on the Digital Economy” (OECD, Paris, 
2019), 11. 
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 We start, hence, with a brief analysis of the main principles that guide the 
international taxation framework, from the wording of the 2015 Report, and that should, 
as well, guide the solution we should propose.  
2.1: Neutrality 
 
‘Taxation should seek to be neutral and equitable between forms of 
business activities.’45 
The first part of this characterization is strictly connected with the idea of non-
ring fencing the digital economy for tax purposes.  
This approach is heavily defended by the OECD46, as well as by the majority of 
academics and practitioners47. We believe that there is no such as thing as the `digital 
economy` as a branch of the economic activity.  Nowadays, it is hard to deviate from the 
view that the digital economy is the economy itself: every business is affected by it in 
some way. Hence, there should be a neutral tax incidence on similar activities 
(substantially speaking), regardless of the more or less digital form they assume. 
‘A neutral tax will contribute to the efficiency by ensuring that optimal 
allocation of the means of production is achieved. A distortion, and the 
corresponding deadweight loss, will occur when changes in price trigger 
different changes in supply and demand than would occur in the absence 
of tax. ‘48 
 Furthermore, this principle should apply in way to guarantee that the tax system 
would not be considered as an aspect more important than pure economic reasons while 
companies deciding how to offer their products in a given market. A different tax treaty 
for more physical or digital products can lead to an economical distortion and, therefore, 
                                                          
45 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 1, 2015 Final Report: Addressing the 
Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (Paris, France, 2015), 20. 
46 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 1, 2015 Final Report: Addressing the 
Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (Paris, France, 2015). See: Ana Paula Dourado, Governação Fiscal 
Global (Lisbon, Portugal: Almedina, 2017), 62. 
47 For a recent argument in favor of this idea, see: Pasquale Pistone; João Félix Pinto Nogueira and Betty 
Andrade. “Comments submitted by The International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) Task Force 
on the Digital Economy,” (OECD, Paris, 2019), 12. 
48 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 1, 2015 Final Report: Addressing the 
Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (Paris, France, 2015), 20. 
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to the existence of a deadweight loss that could ultimately even harm the increase in the 
collection of future income taxes. 
‘In this sense, neutrality also entails that the tax system raises revenue 
while minimizing discrimination in favor of, or against, any particular 
economic choice. This implies that the same principles of taxation should 
apply to all forms of business, while addressing specific features that may 
otherwise undermine an equal and neutral application of those 
principles.’49   
 Given the extract above, we believe that the principle of neutrality is not against 
the existence of the application of specific procedural rules on how to effectively tax more 
digitalized business models. As stated by the Report, there should be no worse or better 
treatment for more digitalized activities. Therefore, the application of identical measures, 
sometimes, could not comply with this requirement. On the other hand, the ‘final tax 
result’, to say so, must be as neutral as possible. 
 In terms of what we aim to highlight for our proposal is that, besides there appear 
to be the need of implementation of new thresholds rules for the configuration of a 
‘virtual’ permanent establishment, these thresholds must not substantially change the 
final tax burden of a given tax payer, compared to similar activities developed in a more 
physical or traditional economic model.  
 Moreover, one should realize that, even in face of the classical ‘types’ of 
permanent establishments, there are already some different approaches to the verification 
of thresholds for each case. 
 We will come back to this discussion.  
2.2: Efficiency 
 
‘Compliance costs to business and administration costs for governments 
should be minimized as far as possible.’50 
                                                          
49 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 1, 2015 Final Report: Addressing the 
Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (Paris, France, 2015), 20. 
50 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 1, 2015 Final Report: Addressing the 
Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (Paris, France, 2015), 20. 
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 The short description of this principle provided also by the Final Report on BEPS 
Action 1 has, nevertheless, several implications.  
 One of the functions of our idea on ‘virtual’ PE, as already mentioned, it to make 
it possible for countries to recover the so called ‘stateless’ income. Therefore, it should 
only be economically valid for those states to implement the new changes if the costs 
related to it do not overcome the amount of taxable revenue that the new rules should 
generate. 
 Moreover, it is also important that the new rules do not impose an extra high 
compliance cost for taxpayers. It is clear that high compliances costs are generally 
connected with the increase of intentional and non-intentional tax avoidance. Other 
possible consequence of the increase of compliance costs for taxpayer is the increase of 
price of the final products, harming the normal functioning of the economy and, 
ultimately, the tax collection as well. 
 
2.3: Certainty and simplicity 
 
 This is probably one of the most challenging principles to be observed while 
developing any new idea on how to tackle our problem. It has also been demonstrated 
that it is a huge concern for both taxpayers and tax authorities, as observed at most of the 
commentaries delivered to OECD during its Public Consultation on the ‘Tax Challenges 
of the Digital Economy, in Paris, March 2019.’51 
 According to the Final Report on BEPS Action 1, the principle of certainty and 
simplicity could be described as follows: 
‘Tax rules should be clear and simple to understand, so that taxpayers 
know where they stand. A simple tax system makes it easier for 
individuals and businesses to understand their obligations and 
entitlements. As a result, businesses are more likely to make optimal 
decisions and respond to intended policy choices.’52 
                                                          
51 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Public Consultation Document. Addressing 
the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy (Paris, France, 2019). 
52 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 1, 2015 Final Report: Addressing the 
Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (Paris, France, 2015), 20. 
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 It is very important not to mistakenly confuse `simplicity` with a simplistic 
approach for the challenges ahead. The adopted solution must be complex enough not to 
ignore differences in different situations and not to leave aspects of the problem 
uncovered. On the other hand, it must be simple enough so that, firstly, it can be 
understandable and, second, that it can be complied with.  
‘Complexity also favors aggressive tax planning, which may trigger 
deadweight losses for the economy.’53 
 Of course, as more complicated and filled with exacerbated details or formulas 
and based on very subjective components the bigger the chance that the proposed 
solutions will not be able to tackle one of the main challenges of the digitalization of the 
economy: the increasing opportunities for tax avoidance. By adding complexity, one adds 
also more space for aggressive tax planning. 
 On the other hand, the attention to simplicity and certainty is also important to 
guarantee the applicability of the implementation of the new rules by the tax authorities 
themselves. In the words of IBFD`s Task Force for the Digital Economy: 
‘(it is important) that the proposed rules can be implemented by any 
jurisdiction, regardless of its degree of development (namely by those 
that often lack suitable skills to manage sophisticated tax rules).’54 
2.4: Effectiveness and fairness 
 
‘Taxation should produce the right amount of tax at the right time, while 
avoiding both double taxation and unintended non-taxation. In addition, 
the potential for evasion and avoidance should be minimized.’55  
 Based on the statement above, it is possible to connect the idea of effective and 
fairness also to a system that functions in the same way for taxpayers in similar situations, 
avoiding unintended consequences, such as double or non-taxation. In that regard, it is 
                                                          
53 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 1, 2015 Final Report: Addressing the 
Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (Paris, France, 2015), 20. 
54 Pasquale Pistone; João Félix Pinto Nogueira and Betty Andrade. “Comments submitted by The 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) Task Force on the Digital Economy,” (OECD, Paris, 
2019), 12. 
55 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 1, 2015 Final Report: Addressing the 
Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (Paris, France, 2015), 20. 
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also important that the taxpayers, in general, perceive the system as a fair and functioning 
one, as it contributes to compliance and, therefore, effectiveness.  
Of course, the more efficient the system, the thinner are the gaps for both tax 
avoidance and evasion. 
‘Prior discussions in the Technical Advisory Groups (TAGs) considered 
that if there is a class of taxpayers that are technically subject to a tax, but 
are never required to pay the tax due to inability to enforce it, then the 
taxpaying public may view the tax as unfair and ineffective. As a result, 
the practical enforceability of tax rules is an important consideration for 
policy makers. In addition, because it influences the collectability of 
taxes, enforceability is crucial to ensure efficiency of the tax system.’56 
 Connected to the idea of effectiveness and fairness is the degree of enforceability 
of taxes in a given system. Therefore, in practical terms, there will be no efficiency or 
fairness in a scenario where there is no collection upon a given number of taxpayers. 
Several problems are identified with the enforceability element. 
 It is important, therefore, to highlight that a proposal based on the creation of a 
‘virtual’ PE threshold, as ours, will have to be able to face challenges on how to enforce 
tax: a) without a physical presence in the source country and b) with a possible increase 
of complexity of norms, lower sophisticated tax authorities may find difficulties applying 
and enforcing them.  
We shall discuss more on that latter. 
2.5: Flexibility 
 
‘Taxation systems should be flexible and dynamic enough to ensure they 
keep pace with technological and commercial developments. It is 
important that a tax system is dynamic and flexible enough to meet the 
current revenue needs of governments while adapting to changing needs 
on an ongoing basis.’57 
                                                          
56 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 1, 2015 Final Report: Addressing the 
Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (Paris, France, 2015), 20. 
57 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 1, 2015 Final Report: Addressing the 
Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (Paris, France, 2015), 21. 
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 Furthermore, we believe that the element of flexibility is also important when 
analyzing the chances of a consensus on the solution to be adopted at an international 
level. It is crucial, therefore, that smaller practical details and ‘formula numbers’ do not 
become a hard part of a future solution to the tax challenges of the digitalization of the 
economy. 
‘This means that the structural features of the system should be durable 
in a changing policy context, yet flexible enough to allow governments 
to respond as required to keep pace with technological and commercial 
developments, taking into account that future developments will often be 
difficult to predict.’58 
Hence, any change in the current framework of the concept of PE, inside the scope 
of reaching a consensus-based solution, should not focus on a handful of particular 
business models and, based on them, develop a countless number of specific details. The 
past models of permanent establishment, for instance, were sufficiently applicable for 
over a century. The solutions to be adopted in the next few years must also be thought to 
last a significant amount of time, being able to encompass future technological 
developments. 
As we are going to detail further ahead, we believe the details should be left to be 
developed by the treaty partners in the field of the DTTs, while the core of the `virtual` 
PE idea should be somehow included in the Multilateral Instrument (MLI) as a kind of a 
minimum standard. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
58 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action 1, 2015 Final Report: Addressing the 
Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (Paris, France, 2015), 21. 
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Chapter 3: Concepts of ‘Source’; ‘Residence’; ‘Permanent 
Establishment’ and Complementary Notes 
 
3.1: Historic notes 
 
In the context of international tax law, ‘source’ and ‘residence’ are the basic 
connecting factors, or ‘nexus’, for taxation of income derived by business activities, 
ultimately because they are the key elements for determining the allocation of taxing 
rights among interested jurisdictions in a cross-border situation.  
According to Ana Paula Dourado: 
“Residence and source are indicative of different levels of economic 
allegiance to a jurisdiction, but both mean that in the presence of 
economic allegiance, taxation is legitimate. Economic allegiance to a 
state could be based on mere consumption, or on business activities and 
passive investment”.59 
 The application of the nexus of ‘source’ and ‘residence’ date back to the beginning 
of the 20th century, with the development of the first studies on modern international tax 
law, as a consequence of the growth of regional and global trade and the need to manage 
the attribution of taxing rights among jurisdictions, notably in the process of 
eliminating/attenuating the emerging juridical double taxation60. Thus, in an international 
perspective, the attribution of taxing rights upon a given income to one state prevents (or 
limits) the other state to tax the same revenue or, at least, demands the latter to provide 
elimination or mitigation of the double-taxation.61 
Historically, academics consider the treaty between Prussia and Austria-Hungary, 
from 189962, to be the first modern tax treaty and, even though we have much broader 
and detailed treaties nowadays, the bedrocks are still pretty much untouched: principles 
                                                          
59 Ana Paula Dourado, “Editorial: In Search of an International Tax System in a Post-BEPS Tax 
Competition Setting.” Intertax, 47, 1 (2019), 2. 
60 Stjepan Gadžo, Nexus Requirements for Taxation of Non-Residents’ Business Income – A Normative 
Evaluation in the Context of the Global Economy (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: IBFD Doctoral Series, 
41, 2018). 
61 The ‘juridical’ double taxation to be prevented can arise both from a dual residence conflict, as well as 
when both the residence and the source contry tax the same income. See: Vikram Chand and Robert Danon, 
The Interaction of Domestic Anti-Avoidance Rules with Tax Treaties (with special references to the BEPS 
project) (Lausanne, Switzerland: Université de Lausanne; Schulthess, 2018), 8-9. 
62 Robert Williams, Fundamentals of Permanent Establishments (Second Ed., Wolters Kluwer, 2014). 
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such as ‘source’, ‘residence’ and ‘permanent establishment’ kept their importance63. 
These ‘nexus’ continued to be the essence of tax treaties and were broadly used specially 
after the World War I, when model tax treaties started being drafted, firstly by the League 
of Nations, in 192864. Today, more than 3.500 DDT are in force65, most of them with the 
common language of the OECD Model Convention66 or, in some more restricted 
situations, based on both the UN and US Models. 
Therefore, since the launching of the BEPS Project, the OECD has recognized that 
the solutions to the challenges of the digital economy, connected to the base erosion and 
profit shifting problem and the issues on the reallocation of taxing rights, lie closely 
related to the application of changes based on the concepts of source and residence. This 
idea is strongly present, for instance, at the reports on BEPS Action 1 and the further 
rounds of discussion lead by the Task Force on the Digital Economy that should deliver 
a consensus-based solution by the end of 2020. 
 In summary, therefore, the existence of such nexus delineates the limitation of 
the right to tax67 from a certain jurisdiction in a cross-border context, especially 
when covered by a double tax treaty.  
3.2: Concepts of ‘residence’ and ‘source’ 
 
                                                          
63 Robert Williams, Fundamentals of Permanent Establishments (The Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer, 2nd 
Ed., 2014). Oddleif Trovik, “Chapter 25: The Allocation of Residual Profits from Unique and Valuable IP 
to Permanent Establishments in Transfer Pricing and Intangibles – US and OECD arm’s length distribution 
of operating profits from IP value chains (IBFD 2019),” IBFD Doctoral Series, 45 (2019), 9-10. 
64 In fact, the drafting of the first Model Tax Convention, by the League of Nations was preceded by the 
1923 Report: League of Nations, Economic and Financial Commission, Report on Double Taxation 
Submitted to the Financial Committee (Geneva, Switzerland, 1923). The actual inaugural model tax 
convention was, as mentioned, published in 1928. League of Nations, Draft Model Treaty on Double 
Taxation and Tax Evasion (Geneva, Switzerland, 1928). 
65 Robert Williams, Fundamentals of Permanent Establishments (The Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer, 2nd 
Ed., 2014). 
66 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Tax treaties: update to OECD Model Tax 
Convention released”, accessed 2019 April 27, https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/tax-treaties-2017-update-
to-oecd-model-tax-convention-released.htm. 
67 It is important to highlight that the ‘right to tax’ does not, in general, means the ‘obligation to tax’. 
Certainly, tax treaties do not impose material norms based on the ideas of `source` and `residence`. On the 
contrary, they provide the grounds for the attribution of competence among signatories. See: Ekkehart 
Reimer; Stefan Schmid and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishment: Domestic Taxation, Bilateral Tax 
Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th Edition, Wolters Kluwer, 2016), 6. 
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 The term ‘resident’, for tax purposes, is responsible for establishing a ‘personal 
attachment’ between a potential taxpayer and a particular State68. The establishment of 
this connection can be done through the application of either domestic or international 
sets of rules and it represents the strongest connection (or bound) possible between a 
juristic person and a country. 
 Furthermore, depending on the rules analyzed, the thresholds for the constitution 
of a ‘resident’ bound can significantly vary. The delimitation of such thresholds is of 
fundamental importance to the entire system of cross-border taxation of business income, 
provided the existence of practical differences in terms of the tax liability of a resident 
and a non-resident. 
 Moreover, meeting the threshold for the attribution of the status of a ‘resident’ is 
the ‘most important criteria for a tax treaty entitlement’69. For matters of our studies, 
nevertheless, one other function of this term must be highlighted: the concept of ‘resident’ 
is applied in order to determine the allocation of taxing rights among jurisdictions in cases 
covered by DTTs70. Article 4(1) of the OECD Model Convention embodies the principle 
of single residence and, therefore, this expression should have the practical impact in 
avoiding the existence of a double resident liability, which would culminate in a case of 
double taxation.  
We should turn our attention to the application of the concept of ‘residence’ (and, 
thus, of a ‘resident’) at an international level. Article 4(1) of the OECD Model 
Convention, thus, is responsible for that task. In verbis: 
‘For the purpose of this Convention, the term ‘resident of a contracting 
state’ means any person who, under the laws of that state, is liable to tax 
therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of management or any 
other criterion of similar nature (…). This term, however, does not 
                                                          
68 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Commentary on Article 4 Concerning the 
Definition of Resident” in Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital: Condensed Version 2017 (Paris, 
France, 2017), I, Paragraph 2.  
69 Dhruv Sanghavi, Structural Issues in the Income Tax Treaty Network: Towards a Coherent Framework 
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70 Roland Ismer & Katharina Reimer. “Chapter 2, Article 4” in Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation 
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220. 
31 
 
include any person who is liable to tax in that state in respect only of 
income from sources in that state or capital situated therein.’71 
 Consequently, in general, DTTs do not prescribe a definition of what would 
constitute a resident for the purpose of the treaty72. On the contrary, DTTs usually provide 
solutions for the case of a given person being considered a resident from the perspective 
of both tax authorities. Therefore, once facing a practical case, one should first identify 
the limits for the concept of ‘tax residence’ prescribed by the domestic laws of both the 
treaty partners. 
 Moreover, Article 4(3) of the OECD Model Convention states that: 
‘Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph 1, a person other than 
an individual is a resident of both Contracting States, the competent 
authorities of the Contracting States shall endeavor to determine by 
mutual agreement the Contracting State to which such person shall be 
deemed to be a resident for the purpose of the Convention, having regard 
to its place of effective management, the place where it is incorporated 
or otherwise constituted and any other relevant factors. In the absence of 
such agreement, such person shall not be entitled to any relief or 
exemption from tax provided by this Convention except to the extent and 
in such manner as may be agreed upon by the competent authorities of 
the Contracting States.’73 
Therefore, in case there emerges a dual residence from the application of both the 
domestic laws, the issue must be solved by using the tools brought by the DTT in 
concrete. If no case of ‘dual-residence’ were verified, then, the domestic rules on 
attribution of this status are maintained. 
On the other hand, deriving from the extract above (Art. 4(3)) it can be said that 
the ‘source country’ is the jurisdiction where a person, not considered to be a resident, 
perform any kind of activity from which there may derive some income. 
                                                          
71 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Model Tax Convention on Income and 
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72 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Model Tax Convention on Income and 
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73 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Model Tax Convention on Income and 
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Note that ‘source country’ and ‘source taxation’ may as well have different 
meanings, given that not every activity developed by a non-resident in the ‘source 
country’ will be subject to ‘source taxation’. The broadness of the thresholds for the latter 
to be possible will depend on both national and international law, as detailed in topic 3.2.1 
infra.  
3.2.1: National and international dimensions  
 
The practical analyses on how to determine a country of ‘residence’ or ‘source’ 
can be expressed, as already mentioned, by two levels or sets of rules: national and 
international.  
The first layer, therefore, is composed of concepts provided by domestic laws of 
the countries (unilateral rules). As a corollary of the principle of legality, common to most 
of the jurisdictions, countries can only impose tax when authorized by law. Among other 
elements, the law must specify who can be taxed and in face of which exact income. The 
broadness of the definitions of ‘residence’ and ‘source’, therefore, is usually seeing in the 
text of the laws as forms of delimitation to the extent of the power to tax. 
Generally, countries impose low thresholds for both the attribution of the status of 
‘resident’ and, even more so, to the attribution of taxing rights upon activities developed 
by non-residents in connection with that country (thus, with broad application of source 
taxation74). The scope of the ‘unilateral rules’, therefore, is generally in line with the idea 
of assuring a higher collection of income taxes.  
Of course, the broadness of both the concept of residence and the range of 
activities developed by non-residents that would be subject to tax will differ from country 
to country, provided they have a relatively wide field of freedom to determine their 
domestic tax laws. It is noticeable, on the other hand, that there are some limits to the 
fiscal sovereignty of countries, on the extent that there must be a minimal identification 
(or connection) between a potential taxpayer and the particular jurisdiction for residence 
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to be verified75 and also for a given source activity to be subject to tax at the source 
country. (See Topic 3.3, ‘Thresholds’, bellow). 
On the other hand, a second layer of conceptualization of the terms ‘source’ and 
‘residence’ exists in virtually every modern tax treaty (bilateral rules) and should prevail 
in face of the national laws of the treaty partners in the case a ‘dual-residence’ (conflict) 
situation arises, as it is the primarily goal of DTTs to eliminate double-taxation.  
Well, the international tax law is a branch of the public international law76 and the 
DTT are indeed subject to the framework of the Vienna Convention77. Therefore, no 
difficulties should arise in understanding that a treaty signed by a given country cannot 
be deemed to have its application barred because a national law deals with the problem 
differently. 
Regarding the broadness of source taxation, nevertheless, the indications 
contained in the DTT should always be seeing in first place, otherwise, it would be 
extremely likely that every cross-border activity of a non-residence would end up been 
taxed exclusively at source states.  
Finally, remember that, as the scope of double tax treaties is primarily the 
elimination/attenuation of double taxation, it is easy to foresee that the extent of the 
concepts of ‘source’ and ‘residence’ tends to be narrower (expanded limitations upon 
taxable situations). 
3.3: Thresholds   
 
3.3.1: For the attribution of a ‘resident status’ 
 
 With that being said, it is important to outline that countries generally adopt one 
of these two tests (sometimes, both) in order to classify a jurist person as a resident: ‘place 
                                                          
75 Stjepan Gadžo, Nexus Requirements for Taxation of Non-Residents’ Business Income – A Normative 
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76 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “International Tax as International Law.” Tax Law Review, 57, 4 (2004), 483. 
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of incorporation’ or ‘place of effective management’ of the company. These concepts are 
of fundamental value to our future considerations. 
 In the first case, a person is considered to be a resident of a given country when it 
was incorporated, established, in that country, following the laws therein. It is rather a 
simple verification test and, by itself, does not usually create practical problems. Other 
nomenclature for this test can be read in the doctrine as ‘legal seat’ theory. 
 Notice that, nowadays, the straight use of the term ‘nationality’, as a connecting 
element instead of ‘residence’, has very little practical application, even because many 
jurisdictions “cover” the idea of nationality under the usage of the ‘legal seat criteria’, as 
part of a test for determining residence. Moreover, also the term ‘domicile’ is not very 
much used, provided it has a more limited broadness in comparison to ‘residence’. 
 Some jurisdictions can also adopt a criterion based on the residence of the 
shareholders of the company to identify its residence, at least when dealing with tax treaty 
covered situations and in where there is an analysis of the ultimate beneficial owner, in 
order to verify, for instance, the possibly of a given company to benefit from a DTT. 
Nevertheless, these more specific rules are out of the scope of this study. 
 The second and more elaborate test is based on the place of effective management 
of the company (or ‘real seat’ theory). This assessment considers where the decisions for 
the functioning of the company really lie. Besides that, elements such as where the 
business risks are undertaken and where most assets and labor force are located are 
usually considered in order to identify the effective place of management of the company. 
Surely, this is a more complex test and can more easily culminate in arguable practical 
decisions. 
 Despite its practical complexity, this is the recommended approach by the OECD, 
especially within the framework of its efforts in fighting artificial business strategies, like 
the incorporation of ‘mailbox companies’, without relevant substrate, mostly for 
aggressive tax planning purposes. 
 Hence, we come back to the idea that the cross-border interaction between 
national rules embodying each one a different test for attribution of the status of ‘resident’ 
can lead to situations of dual-residence. This can be easily exemplified as follows: 
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Company X is incorporated in country A and has its effective management in 
country B. The internal legislation of the first country (Country A) adopts the criterion of 
the place of incorporation as element of determination of residence. Therefore, Company 
X is views as a resident therein. On the other side, Country’s B domestic law adopts the 
place of effective management as the decisive criterion for attribution of residence to a 
given person. Hence, for the tax authorities of Country B, Company X is also a residence 
of that jurisdiction. 
In this case, Company X would be seeing as a resident from the perspective of 
both tax authorities. This is an issue that international tax law tries to deal with via the 
existence of specific provisions in treaties designed to attribute the sole residence status 
to one jurisdiction (principle of the single residence). 
3.3.2: For the imposition of a ‘source taxation’ 
 
 Besides the tax liability of the residents, also the state of source can be able to tax 
activities developed in connection to its jurisdiction, even if by some jurist person not 
incorporated thereof and without any effective management at the source state. This 
possibility is evaluated in connection with some other thresholds.  
Hence, considering the layer of unilateral limitations, countries are relatively free 
to establish their own rules on attributing this nexus and, so, to develop their thresholds 
in order to impose tax upon a non-resident. According to Gadžo, four broad categories of 
thresholds are usually adopted, varying from different ideas of permanent establishment 
to widely applicable withholding taxes with very low thresholds78. Nowadays, 
nevertheless, the OECD PE ‘model’ has been influencing more and more domestic 
legislations.79 
 On an international level, nevertheless, these thresholds are usually connected to 
the idea of a permanent establishment, reflected at the wording of most of the DTTs.80 
                                                          
78 Stjepan Gadžo, Nexus Requirements for Taxation of Non-Residents’ Business Income – A Normative 
Evaluation in the Context of the Global Economy (Amsterdam, the Netherlands: IBFD Doctoral Series, 41, 
2018). 
79 Ekkehart Reimer; Stefan Schmid and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishment: Domestic Taxation, 
Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th Edition, Wolters Kluwer, 2016), 5. 
80 Stjepan Gadžo, Nexus Requirements for Taxation of Non-Residents’ Business Income – A Normative 
Evaluation in the Context of the Global Economy (Amsterdam, the Netherlands: IBFD Doctoral Series, 41, 
2018). 
36 
 
 Although different from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, when adopted domestically 
(at a national dimension) or from DTT to DTT (at an international level), the idea of PE 
embodies the way countries defines the existence of a significant enough material 
presence of a given non-resident business in its territory. This idea, as further discussed, 
is outdated and most be rethought. 
 Therefore, so far, we have reached the conclusion that the elements of ‘source’ 
and ‘residence’ work as nexus for attribution of taxing rights among jurisdictions in a 
cross-border situation. By attributing taxing rights to one jurisdiction, when analyzed 
through the perspective of DTTs, these concepts impose limits to the taxing impulse of 
the other country. Hence, the importance of this distribution lies in the interest of 
countries (and international commerce) to eliminate or, at least, to attenuate the 
phenomenon of double-taxation and to better allocate the tax revenues among the global 
community.  
3.4 Tax liabilities 
 
3.4.1: Upon residents (‘universal liability’) 
 
In virtually every national legal system, the tax liability of a resident is broader 
than a non-resident, exactly because, as stated above, the connection (or nexus) for 
taxation is stronger between a resident and its country of residence. In practical terms, 
therefore, the resident usually has an unlimited tax liability, which means that it is taxed 
in a worldwide basis, or, in other words, it is taxed on the income received anywhere in 
the world and not only in face of a ‘domestic income’81. Besides, this income is usually 
taxed in a net basis. 
 Thus, the determination of the residence of the company is of fundamental 
importance to delineate its tax liability and, therefore, it is easy to identify that, in most 
cases, it is not ideal to be a ‘dual resident’. With that in mind, basically every DTT have 
provisions on how to solve cases of dual residence involving a jurist person connected to 
the treaty partners. 
                                                          
81 Dhruv Sanghavi, Structural Issues in the Income Tax Treaty Network: Towards a Coherent Framework, 
(Enschede, the Netherlands: Ipskamp Printing BV, 2018), 209. Maarten de Wilde, Sharing the Pie: Taxing 
Multinationals in a Global Market, (Amsterdam, the Netherlands, IBFD, 2017), 3. 
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3.4.2: Upon non-residents (‘territorial liability’) 
 
 On the other hand, a non-resident can still exercise economic activities and 
generate income in a particular State, both passive and active, of course. Therefore, the 
non-residents can also be subject to tax in that foreign state being, thus, considered bound 
by a ‘secondary nexus’. 
 Nevertheless, as bonded by a weaker nexus than the one of the residents, the 
source State can only tax the person’s deriving income from its territory if certain 
thresholds are met. If these thresholds are met, then, the non-resident will also bear a tax 
liability in the source state. 
Of course, this tax liability would still be narrowly, as it should be connected only 
to the income derived from activities develop in connection with that particular source 
country. Again, this form of liability is more restricted than the one bore by the residents 
and is, thus, usually called as a “territorial” liability. 
The determination of the source of a given income may, nevertheless, be an 
extremely complicated task, especially with the current development of the global and 
digitalized economy. As stated in Chapter 1, in the scenario of a digital economy is hard 
to determine where value is being created, especially when dealing with highly digitalized 
business of extremely fragmented production models. 
 On the other hand, not every ‘source activity’ is deemed to create sufficient nexus 
between the jurist person and the country where the activity is being performed as to 
justify the imposition of income tax from the latter. As already mentioned, the ‘secondary 
nexus’ is a rather weaker one and, therefore, the thresholds evaluated at the topic 3.2.1 
ahead must be met in order to enable source taxation. 
3.5: The classical concept of permanent establishment 
 
According to what we have analyzed, despite the attribution of the so called 
‘resident status’, it is also important for enterprises, as well as for tax authorities, to 
determine if there should also lie a tax liability of the juristic person in the source state. 
That should be clear by now. 
Firstly, because, where no treaties apply, there can be a case of unavoidable 
double-taxation over that income. Secondly, and more importantly for our study, because, 
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in case the situation is covered by a DTT, the taxing rights of the particular business 
income may be attributed to the source state, provided the thresholds contained at the 
DTT are met. 
To sum up what has already been said, on a tax treaty basis, therefore, these 
thresholds are usually connected with the idea of the existence of a so-called permanent 
establishment of the non-resident in the source country and, where such DTTs exist, their 
limitations on attributing taxing rights to the source state must prevail the limitations 
imposed by domestic law. Moreover, it is important to notice that, in general, the 
attributions of taxing rights to the source countries is considered in a more restricted and 
conservative way in DTTs than it is in national legislations. 
Therefore, in a cross-border situation covered by a double tax treaty, the final 
delineation of whose is the right to tax will derive from the analysis of the concept of 
permanent establishment, given the fact that there lies the threshold for the attribution (or 
not) of the mentioned rights to the source state. It is also important to notice that, due to 
the profound changes by which the global economy is undergoing, the actual material 
approach to this element (permanent establishment) is undeniably in crises and must be 
debated. This is study aims to contribute in that matter. 
Finally, the importance of the idea of permanent establishment is not only by 
‘positive’ means (the attribution of taxing rights to the source country) but, consequently, 
also by a ‘negative’ way (excluding the right to tax of the residence state or obliging it to 
give a tax credit to eliminate double-taxation)82. Thus, no doubts shall arise in saying 
that changes in matters of reallocation of taxing rights, inside the current 
framework, should be thought around the concept of permanent establishment. 
At the very beginning of this study we were able to conclude that ‘residence’ and 
‘source’ are the decisive connecting factors for the attribution of taxing rights in cross-
border situations. We have also understood that, according to the current framework of 
the web of double tax treaties, the taxation at the level of the source is a ‘subsidiary’ or 
rather ‘exceptional’ taxation. 
 Hence, according to the words of most tax treaties in force today, the taxing rights 
of a given income should be allocated to the country of residence, unless there can be 
                                                          
82 Carlo Garbarino, “Permanent Establishments and BEPS Action 7: Perspectives in Evolution.” Intertax, 
47, 4. (2019), 366. 
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verified the existence of enough ‘material’ connection between the non-resident and the 
source country. We have also seeing that this idea of enough connection and the 
thresholds for its measurement are embodied at the concept of permanent establishment83. 
 Therefore, in our point of view, any proposal for the changing of the international 
taxation dynamic, based on our current framework (change without revolution), the 
consequent reallocation of taxation rights and the actual taxation of stateless income must 
deal with changes in this concept.  
 Art.5(1) of the OECD Model Convention states: 
“For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘permanent establishment’ 
means a fixed place of business through which business of an enterprise 
is wholly or partially carried on”.84 
The first important characteristic of a permanent establishment, therefore, is the 
notion of habituality, mainly derived from the use of the term ‘permanent’. Of course, it 
is not demanded, nor it could be, that the activity developed by a non-resident lasts 
forever, undefined in time. Nevertheless, a certain time threshold must be met for the 
activity developed to gain the quality of a ‘permanent establishment’. Otherwise, if no 
time limit was required, mere occasional interference from a non-resident in the source 
country economic life would generate a tax liability therein. Ultimately, this would raise 
compliance challenges and could limit international trade. 
To deal in a more concrete way with the generality of problems related to the term 
‘permanent’, the OECD Model Convention adopts a minimum time of presence in the 
source country, as a necessary element for the constitution of a PE. This minimum 
temporal requirement is of 12 months, according to Art.5(3) of the abovementioned 
document. Nevertheless, some treaty partners preferred to lower this time requisite to 6 
months, which can also be influenced by the specific kind of permanent establishment in 
study. 
The second term that must be analyzed is ‘establishment’.  
                                                          
83 Carlo Garbarino, “Permanent Establishments and BEPS Action 7: Perspectives in Evolution.” Intertax, 
47, 4. (2019), 366. 
84 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Model Tax Convention on Income and 
Capital: Condensate Version (Paris, France, 2017), Art.5(1). 
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For over a century, since the beginning of the adoption of such a term, the idea of 
establishment was closely connected to a material presence of the non-resident in the 
territory of the source country. Even today, when reading Article 5 of the OECD Model 
Convention, the material element is strongly present. Our study will try to modify this 
approach. 
Therefore, permanent establishment, according to the basic ground of its classical 
concept, can be said to be a material activity developed by a non-resident, lasting a 
minimum time threshold (habitual activity).  
Nevertheless, the classical concept of permanent establishment provides a set of 
exceptions, where cases of material presence lasting a sufficient among of time is still not 
considered as a PE. These exceptions can be seeing in Art.5 (4) of the Model Convention 
and we will deal with them, individually, ahead at our studies. For now, it is important to 
underline that the idea behind the exemptions is that such activities are of a ‘auxiliary’ or 
‘preparatory’ character. 
Therefore, we could amplify the classic concept of permanent establishment now 
to: ‘a material activity developed by a non-resident in the core of its business rationale, 
lasting a minimum time threshold’. 
Finally, the Article 5 of the Model Convention provides the indication of special 
types of permanent establishments, namely the agency PE and the construction and 
installation (or assembly site) (hereinafter, CAS PE). These provisions are responsible, 
therefore, to enlarge the idea of a PE, which would, thus, go beyond an office, a placed 
fixed in the soil, and could be deemed to be even a single person acting on behalf of the 
company.  
As already mentioned at Topic 1.3, the BEPS project, especially throughout 
Action 7, tried to revisit issues on the attribution of the ‘auxiliary’ or ‘preparatory’ 
character to a given activity and to limit the possibilities of avoidance of the PE status by 
the design of highly artificially fragmented activities85. 
3.6: Types of permanent establishment 
 
                                                          
85 Carlo Garbarino, “Permanent Establishments and BEPS Action 7: Perspectives in Evolution.” Intertax, 
47, 4. (2019), 371. 
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3.6.1: Fixed place of business 
 
 The FPB PE is the standard type of permanent establishment and should be the 
first one to be searched both by tax authorities performing an audit as well as by 
businesses when understanding and organizing their activities. All other PE are said to be 
subsidiary forms. We shall come back to that later, even because, as we are going to 
discuss, we believe that, especially when adopted an idea of virtual PE, there can be a 
parallel existence of more than one PE type at the development of the same business by 
a given non-resident. 
 This principal type of PE, therefore, is the classical image of the wording of Art.5 
of the OECD Model Convention. 
3.6.2: Dependent agent 
 
 The need for a ‘mortar and brick’ structure on the source country, nevertheless, 
may be unnecessary if the requirement of ‘habituality’ is met by means of the presence 
of agents of the company acting in that state. 
 Certainly, not every agent would constitute a permanent establishment, as not 
every ‘building’ would. The main condition for it to happen is that the agent acts as a 
‘dependent agent’ and, thus, that acts on behalf of the company. Surely, all sorts of 
situations may influence the analyses of the actual ‘dependence’ of the agent in face of 
the company and a detailed analysis of this kind of PE would go beyond the scope of this 
study. Nevertheless, we shall provide some commentaries about the most important 
points of this topic.  
 The first point, which was reinforced by the work developed within the Action 7 
of the BEPS Action Plan is that the substance of the conduct of the agent most prevail in 
face of any formal, mainly contractual, evidence. Therefore, a agent maybe contractually 
deemed to be independent, but, in fact he has no authority to bound the company or to 
negotiate on his own terms.  
Other forms of verifying the practical (in)dependence of the agent is to identify if 
the latter is acting with or without exclusivity to the company and inside or outside the 
normal course of the business. The economic (in)dependence of the agent is also an 
indicative to be look upon. 
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Finally, nowadays countries have much broader tools to actually identify and 
‘look beyond’ artificial arrangements for fragmenting coherent business activities into 
various formally dependent agents to avoid the constitution of a PE. 
3.6.3: Site of construction and installation (or assembly) 
 
 The idea behind this form of permanent establishment, provided by the OECD 
Model Convention at its Art.5(3), is to also include the non-habitual enterprise of 
constructions and/or assembly, given that they actually represent a relevant presence at 
the economy of the source country.  
 This is a very particular kind of permanent establishment and we should also raise 
questions on the future inclusion, for instance, of high capacity productive 3D Printers or 
IA capable of developing constructions activities without (or with very limited) human 
presence on the scope of its concept. 
3.6.4: ‘Service’ permanent establishment 
 
 This other form of permanent establishment is expressly mentioned by the UN 
Model Convention86, but cannot yet be seen at the OECD Model Convention, apart from 
some commentaries in that regard, introduced by the Organization in 2008. 
 One explanation to this fact lies in the point that the UN Model is mostly designed 
to be implemented in DTT celebrated between developed and developing countries, 
provided the fact that it tends to give more taxing rights for capital-import countries, or 
source countries, to adopt the terminology we are already used to.  
 According to Art.5 (3) (b) of the UN Model Convention, the Service PE could be 
described as: 
‘The furnishing of services, including consultancy services, by an 
enterprise through employees or other personnel engaged by the 
enterprise for such purpose, but only if activities of that nature continue 
within a Contracting State for a period or periods aggregating more than 
                                                          
86 United Nations. United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing 
Countries (New York, USA, 2017), Art. 5(3). 
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183 days in any 12-month period commencing or ending in the fiscal year 
concerned.’ 87 
 In our understanding, nevertheless, this type of permanent establishment appears 
to be similar to the figure of an Agent PE provided by Art.5 (5) (c) of the OECD Model, 
in verbis: 
‘Art.5 (5): Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 but 
subject to the provisions of paragraph 6, where a person is acting in a 
contracting state on behalf of an enterprise and, in doing so, habitually 
concludes contracts or habitually plays the principal role leading to the 
conclusion of contracts that are routinely concluded without material 
modification by the enterprise, and the contracts are:  
c) for the provision of services by that enterprise, 
that enterprise shall be deemed to have a permanent establishment in that 
State in respect of any activities which that person undertakes for the 
enterprise (…).’88 
 With the inclusion of this new type of permanent establishment in the wording of the UN 
Model, several developing countries have reinforced their wish to tax the provision of technical 
services, even without a classic PE qualification at the source.89 
Moreover, also several of these countries do not believe on the sustainability of the 
concept of permanent establishment, in terms of safeguarding taxation at the source level and, 
therefore, are qualifying the provision of technical services as royalties, even if no IP is 
transferred, such as in Brazil, which contributes to enlarge the taxable base therein.90 
 Nevertheless, we believe that our proposal, discussed in Part III, would be able to align 
the concept of ‘permanent establishment’ to an significant taxation at the source level, without 
adding to the complexity of attributing the ‘status’ of a royalty to some payments, as observed 
above. 
                                                          
87 United Nations. United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing 
Countries (New York, USA, 2017), Art. 5 (3) (b). 
88 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Model Tax Convention on Income and 
Capital: condensate version (Paris, France, 2017), Art.5 (5) (b). 
89 João Francisco Bianco and João Tomazella Santos. “A Change of Paradigm in International Tax Law: 
Article 7 of Tax Treaties and the Need to Resolve the Source versus Residence Dichotomy.” Bulletin for 
International Taxation, 70, 3 (2016), 12 p. 
90 Brazil, Receita Federal, “Interpretative Declaratory Act RFB 5/2014” (2014). 
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3.7: Exceptions for the existence of a permanent establishment  
 
 The analyses of the exceptions for the constitution of a permanent establishment 
is crucial for our study. With the advent of the digital economy, as already addressed by 
the study, the possibilities of aggressive tax planning had rapidly grown. 
 Because of the evolution of the business models, the situations designed to 
represent exceptions to the formation of a permanent establishment are now mostly 
outdated. They were designed to exclude from the thresholds of source taxation the 
activities merely auxiliary or preparatory, that, thus, would not represent a strong presence 
in the economic life of the given source jurisdiction.  
 Nevertheless, as already mentioned, those activities are no more merely 
preparatory of auxiliary. Besides, it has also became easier for businesses to just adapt 
their multinational structures to meet the ‘auxiliary’ or ‘preparatory’ character in several 
jurisdictions by fragmenting cohesive activities into several small parts.  
 Before moving on with the critics of the current model, at another part of this 
study, lets understand the actual scenario. 
 According to Art. 5(4) of the OECD Model Convention, the following exceptions 
should apply to the constitution of a Permanent Establishment: 
Art. 5(4): ‘Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this Article, the 
term “permanent establishment” shall be deemed not to include: 
a) the use of facilities solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery 
of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise; 
b) the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the 
enterprise solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery; 
c) the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the 
enterprise solely for the purpose of processing by another enterprise; 
d) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of 
purchasing goods or merchandise or of collecting information, for the 
enterprise; 
e) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of 
carrying on, for the enterprise, any other activity; 
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f) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for any combination 
of activities mentioned in subparagraphs a) to e), provided that such 
activity or, in the case of subparagraph f), the overall activity of the fixed 
place of business, is of a preparatory or auxiliary character.’91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
91 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Model Tax Convention on Income and 
Capital: condensate version (Paris, France, 2017), Art. 5(4). 
46 
 
Part II 
Current Proposals 
Chapter 4: OECD Proposals for Taxing the Digital Economy 
 
 Provided that the OECD was not able to deliver a definitive solution to tackle the 
tax challenges of the digital economy, within the scope of BEPS Action 1 and that, 
therefore, the Final Report was not sufficiently conclusive, the G20 renewed the mandate 
for the Task Force on the Digital Economy to carry on the work on finding a consensus-
based solution. 
 This new mandate is for the Organization to provide the details of a consensus-
based solution to be widely implemented in a global level. Therefore, the OECD has 
focused on trying to exercise an inclusive development of this solution, embracing 
delegates from all the 129 jurisdictions currently engaged at the BEPS Inclusive 
Framework. 
 Moreover, not only countries are able to participate in this construction, but also 
further stakeholders, such as the taxpayers, academics, other NGOs and the civil society 
in general. Here, thus, lies the scope of this Public Consultation: to offer for this general 
set of stakeholders an early opportunity to provide inputs and to help designing the desired 
solution. 
 We say ‘early stage’ because, in fact, the OECD has not yet chosen the basis for 
the new method to be implemented. In the words of the Organization itself, this Public 
Consultation is inserted into a ‘non-prejudice’ framework, which means that any of the 
suggested methods (or even new methods proposed) are still in an equal foot position and 
must be considered. 
 Although in theory the inclusiveness of the work carried out by the OECD seems 
to be unquestionable, some stakeholders claim that, in fact, countries are not in an equal 
footing position at the rounds of discussions. 
 We stand with what seems to be the majority (considering the opinions delivered 
by several classes of stakeholders at the public consultation event, held in Paris) and we 
do believe that the work of the OECD is fairly inclusive. Of course, in a political point of 
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view, is utopic to imagine that the influence of the positions of big economies can be at 
the same level of those from smaller economies. Moreover, as countries with more 
sophisticated tax authorities and with higher tradition on the studies of the subjects are 
more likely to provide for more developed inputs and, therefore, to shape the possible 
solutions. 
 To sum up, we believe that the OECD is the right forum to discuss the measures 
aimed, if we think on implementing them in a worldwide basis. Our idea on including the 
changes in the PE concept at the OECD Model Convention and to include it at the MLI, 
confirm our position. 
 We should now advance towards the technicalities of the proposals or, at least, the 
design models of them, contained at the consultation document. This document, as 
already briefly mentioned, is divided into two main pillars, which coincides with the two 
sets of challenges that we have covered: BEPS and reallocation of taxing rights. 
4.1: Pillar one (reallocation of taxing rights) 
 
4.1.1: The ‘user participation’ proposal 
 
 Basically, the first proposal to by consulted aims to shift the taxing rights (partially 
or entirely) to the jurisdiction where the users are located. This proposal is aimed at 
targeting only highly digitalized business models that relies on the active participation of 
users as an essential mechanism for creating value.92  
 Therefore, the OECD highlights that this new method for attribution of taxing 
rights might only provide for changes in the nexus rules for companies such as (and, 
maybe, limited to) online social medias, marketplaces or search engines93. As for the rest 
of the businesses, the current nexus would be maintained. 
 Initially, we believe that the scope of application of this proposal is extremely 
limited and unable to tackle the tax challenges in a comprehensive manner. As already 
discussed, it should be clear that the value created by users is not economically significant 
in all the new business models of the digital economy, especially when dealing with B2B 
                                                          
92 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Public Consultation Document. Addressing 
the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy (Paris, France, 2019), 9-11. 
93 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Public Consultation Document. Addressing 
the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy (Paris, France, 2019), 9-11. 
48 
 
operations. Besides, also several digital services do not count on such an active 
participation of users and derive their value from other elements, such as massive IP 
holdings and operations (cloud computing, for example).94 
 In other words, the ‘user participation’ idea would be responsible for ring-fencing 
some of the new business models95. This could have implications in terms of neutrality 
issue, when looking at the Ottawa Framework, for instance. In another perspective, it 
could also ultimately distort the nature of the tax itself (from an income tax to an earning 
tax).  
 In this regard, as from what we can anticipate in terms of this proposal, a tax 
burden at the user jurisdiction can arise even when no revenue is yet derived from there. 
The example would be, for instance, the simple collection (or processing) of data, without 
been used to direct advertisement or without been sold. We believe that the collection and 
processing of information should not, per se, be subject to income taxation in digital 
businesses, simply because they are outside of the scope of the nature of this tax and, 
ultimately, because it is not taxed inside more traditional business models that also 
collects and process data in large amount. 
The extent of these implications, nevertheless, would depend on the exact way on 
which the proposal would be applied. 
 Besides, the ‘user participation’ proposal would be responsible for linking 
taxation with a very subjective nexus. It is indeed complicate to establish the exact (or 
even approximate) value that user A or B would create for the company. In order to 
objectify the user contribution, the formula will have to be extremely complex and able 
to accommodate, for instance, the numbers of other users reached by that participation, 
the degree of acceptance (or enjoyment) proportionated to other users, etc. Nevertheless, 
the ‘math’ would still struggle to capture if the externality was positive or negative for 
the company. 
                                                          
94 Pasquale Pistone; João Félix Pinto Nogueira and Betty Andrade. “Comments submitted by The 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) Task Force on the Digital Economy,” (OECD, Paris, 
2019), 26. 
95 Pasquale Pistone; João Félix Pinto Nogueira and Betty Andrade. “Comments submitted by The 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) Task Force on the Digital Economy,” (OECD, Paris, 
2019), 21. 
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 The OECD and some scholars, therefore, discuss the idea of a ‘fixed rate’ to be 
applied in substitution of an actual attempt to measure the contribution of each and every 
user. Countries would create a determined threshold (based on the number of users, for 
example) and then shift the taxing rights for the user jurisdiction in a portion of the 
revenues obtained by the company or the group (10, 20, 30%...).96 
 There is also a strong debate in terms of considering the application of a ‘residual 
profit split’ method to the jurisdiction of the users. That would, of course, require the 
analyses of the routine profit made by the company, with the usage of the actual (or 
adapted) transfer pricing rules. The difference between the total profits of the company 
and the routine profits would indicate the residual profits to be shifted to the market 
jurisdiction. 
 The first problem, in our point of view, is that there is not merely one exact transfer 
price ‘mark’ and, thus, when analyzing all the routine transactions of the companies, there 
will be a more or less large margin of values to be attributed to these ‘routine 
transactions’, opening more space for inter-nations disputes. 
 Moreover, it would require a fairly advanced level of cooperation and integration 
among countries as well as a high degree of sophistication of tax authorities to evaluate 
all the routine transactions conducted, probably, in several jurisdictions. 
 Finally, it would also be hard to find consensus in determining what would be 
considered a routine profit or not. It surely depends on the nature of the business 
conducted. The rapidly changing on business models, as well, could represent an extra 
difficulty for this determination and, therefore, the feature of ‘flexibility’, inside the 
Ottawa Framework would probably be compromised by the adoption of this ‘quantum 
attribution’ idea. More on that at the following topic. 
 Another issue that concerns us is related to the positions of the OECD in relation 
to the design of this proposal. In paragraph 20 of the Public Consultation Document97, the 
Organization defends the possibility of imposing a tax burden even where the company 
                                                          
96 This method of attribution of a quantum to be taxed at the user’s jurisdiction is usually called as 
‘formulary apportionment’. See: Pasquale Pistone; João Félix Pinto Nogueira and Betty Andrade. 
“Comments submitted by The International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) Task Force on the 
Digital Economy,” (OECD, Paris, 2019), 38. 
97 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Public Consultation Document. Addressing 
the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy (Paris, France, 2019). 
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has no ‘taxable presence’. We are completely against this statement and, moreover, we 
think this represents a contradiction with all the work been developed by the OECD, 
especially if taken into account the outcomes of BEPS Action 7 and all the expressed 
political will to maintain the current framework of international taxation. 
 In other words, no tax burden shall arise where there is no ‘taxable presence’. The 
solution here, as we have been defending, is to create new (and broader) thresholds for 
this ‘taxable presence’ to be verified, through changes in the concept of permanent 
establishment and the inclusion of a virtual PE. This would help to secure the observance 
of the principle of certainty, defended at the Ottawa Framework scenario. 
 Moreover, it is important to understand that user participation can be measured 
(and taxed) in a different and more efficient way, at the jurisdiction of the users (source 
state). As more engagement of users to a given business, more attractive it would be to 
advertisements and, therefore, more contracts can be celebrated between the non-resident 
digital company and local companies interested in advertising their products. The source 
state will, therefore, be able to catch the tax revenue derived by this engagement through 
the application of VAT. It is more efficient and still secures tax revenues. 
 Hence, we are against the application of the OECD ‘user participation’ proposal. 
4.1.2: The ‘marketing intangible’ proposal 
 
The ‘marketing intangible’ proposal has a similar rationale as of the ‘user 
participation’ and, in our point of view, is based on a undesirable premise: to link the 
income taxation with the location of the users (or costumers, to better adapt the language 
to the new proposal on focus). 
Before going further on the analysis of the technicalities and design issues of this 
proposal, we should explain our last paragraph. 
Since the beginning of this paper, we have highlighted our desire to develop a 
feasible solution, capable of tackling the problem in the most comprehensive way we 
could. In order to do so, we have reached the conclusion that this proposed solution must 
feet within the margins of the current framework for international taxation.  
We say that not because there would be no ideally better solutions outside of it, 
but simply because consensus among the international community is key and countries 
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have already clearly stated that they want to perpetrate changes inside the current rules, 
but they do not want to revolution the system.98 
Therefore, one should notice that the state of the market (or of the user base) is a 
concept that not necessarily match with the concept of ‘source state’. We have extensively 
addressed the evolution and the role of the latter concept as a nexus for cross-border 
income taxation. If a proposal wants to be practicable enough, at this stage, we believe 
that it should aim at solving the reallocation issue by treating states as either of source or 
residence, as it would enables consensus to be reached much easier. 
Furthermore, as already ventilated, the nexus of user base or market state 
(consumers base) are more adequate to be taken into account in terms of indirect taxation, 
consumption taxes, like the VAT. 
After these parentheses, therefore, we should advance in the analyses of the 
technicalities of this second proposal inside pillar one of the OECD Consultation 
Document. 
Although we disagree on the premises, the first feature to be analyzed is the 
broadness of this proposal, which is certainly more comprehensive than the previous one. 
Here, a much broader spectrum of business models would be affected, creating a less 
ring-fencing solution. Even because more traditional business models also use marketing 
intangibles. 
This proposal would, therefore, work also with the usage of some sort of ‘residual 
profit split’ method, as there would be a similar calculation format from the one observed 
in the previous proposal (‘user participation’). The problems, here, would be more or less 
the same. 
Looking the influences of an eventual adoption of this proposal in face of the 
principles of the Ottawa Framework, we would see that, although less ring-fencing, the 
‘marketing intangibles’ proposal would probably raise even more problems in terms of 
certainty, simplicity and efficiency. 
                                                          
98 Also noticing the practical difficulty in obtaining consensus for revolutionary solutions: Adolfo Mantín 
Jiménez, “BEPS, the Digital(ized) Economy and the Taxation of Services and Royalties.” Intertax, 46, 8/9 
(2018), 637-638. 
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A major problem, identified, for instance, by the IBDF Task Force on the Digital 
Economy is in relation to the terms or conceptualization (definition) of what would 
constitute a marketing intangible and what would be outside of this concept, been merely 
trading intangibles. Even today, with concepts with a similar importance in the current 
system (namely dividends, royalties and interests) states struggle in finding similar 
concepts. 
The solutions available for this problem, at least in a short to mid-term would be 
either to establish a closed list of which activity should be included in each of the category 
(marketing or trading intangible), according to each business model. This list would 
hardly be a consensus and, even if it did become one, the constant need to update it would 
bring this challenge of consensus over and over again. The feature of flexibility would be 
severely harmed. 
If the analyses were to be left for a case-by-case analyze, then the aspects of 
certainty and fairness would be compromised, and we would probably face an increase in 
cross-border tax disputes. 
In any of the cases, compliance costs for both taxpayers and tax authorities would 
increase, without a corresponding satisfactory final result. Therefore, we believe that this 
idea, apart from our conceptual divergence, is also fairly too complex and hard to be 
implemented, specially by low sophisticated tax authorities. 
Moreover, although we have recognized a broader scope of application and a less 
ring-fencing character, this proposal is still unable to tackle the non or low taxed digital 
presence of companies in states other than where they maintain they consumers base. 
Imagine, for example, that company A, provider of a given digital service, is 
incorporated and managed from country X. This same company installs and maintains, 
even without (or with very restricted) work force, a huge software installation in 
jurisdiction Y. Nevertheless, the users of this digital service are mainly located in 
countries W and Z. By the terms of the marketing intangible proposal, we would still be 
unable to tackle the problem of the avoidance of taxable (or, at least, significant taxable) 
presence in country Y, while, in our example, countries W and Z would still be able to 
obtain VAT tax revenues. 
4.1.3: The ‘significant economic presence’ proposal 
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Finally, the pillar one of the Public Consultation Document introduces a third 
possible design for a new solution to the allocation problem, based on a significant 
economic presence. Our reader may remember that, we ourselves, already made use of 
this expression when introducing the scope of our studies. 
It is important to notice, nevertheless, that this expression is too broad and can by 
translated into several (or no) things. We will elaborate more on that from this moment. 
In the Public Consultation Document itself, this proposal is the less developed one 
and clearly represents the thought of the Organization to bring the ‘significant economic 
presence’ back to the discussions. This proposal was more elaborated at the 2015 Final 
Report on BEPS Action 1 and, therefore, we should base some of our commentaries also 
on the latter document.  
 According to the Public Consultation Document proposal, this significant 
economic present would be measured by a combination of revenue with one or more 
elements, in principle, from six options provided: 
‘(1) the existence of a user base and the associated data input; 
(2) the volume of digital content derived from the jurisdiction; 
(3) billing and collection in local currency or with a local form of 
payment;  
(4) the maintenance of a website in a local language; 
(5) responsibility for the final delivery of goods to customers or the 
provision by the enterprise of other support services such as after-sales 
service or repairs and maintenance; or   
(6)  sustained marketing and sales promotion activities, either online or 
otherwise, to attract customers.’99 
 In our point of view, nevertheless, none of the above-mentioned elements would 
desirably be applicable. The first falls into the problems, already extensively discussed, 
about attributing taxing rights in connection to the number of users. Even further, this 
                                                          
99 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Public Consultation Document. Addressing 
the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy (Paris, France, 2019), 16. 
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first point connects taxation with data input (raw data) something that our proposal should 
reject (see Part III). 
 The second element would be the volume of digital content derived from the 
jurisdiction. The problem, of course, is that this volume can significant vary in value, 
being, therefore, an extremely subject element to be taken into account. 
 The third bullet point seems to be ‘born’ already outdated. Already today, 
especially in the European Union, payments are made in a common currency. Also, in 
business celebrated with big countries or involving giant MGC, payments can usually be 
made in standard currency, such as American Dollars. In a not very far future, probably, 
payments could also be made in standard crypto currencies.  
 As for the maintenance of a website in the local language, we do not believe it 
would effectively work. Most companies adopt a website in English or other regionally 
relevant languages, not necessarily adopting the national language of the source State but 
been perfectly accessible by users on that particular jurisdictions (e.g. Russian in central 
and eastern European countries). This can also impose problems when several 
neighboring countries adopt the same language (e.g. Spanish in Latin America) but the 
company is not actually engaged in significant activities in some of these countries. 
  The responsibility for the final delivery of goods to customers or the provision by 
the enterprise of other support services such as after-sales service or repairs and 
maintenance also does not seem like an interesting link. 
 The last point, by its turn, works in the direction of replacing the nexus of ‘source 
jurisdiction’ to ‘market jurisdiction’. 
 We thus conclude that, although the OECD defends a cumulative threshold, 
between revenue and one (or more) of the above discussed elements, revenue should be 
the only element, as it is in the ‘material economy’.  
  
4.2: Pillar two (BEPS issues) 
 
4.2.1: Income inclusion rule 
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 According to the Public Consultation Document, the two measures under this 
second pillar are suggested to be adopted as complements to the efforts undertaken in 
pillar one. Moreover, the two proposals under this pillar are suggested to be adopted 
together, in order to tackle the remaining BEPS problems that would still be found. The 
OECD is, therefore, concerned with the possibility of MGC shifting operations to low or 
no tax jurisdictions, simply for tax purposes.100 
 With that in mind, the purpose on the creation of an ‘income inclusion rule’ would 
work as the fixation of a minimum tax rate to which a controlled company would have to 
pay when operating abroad. If this company, therefore, is conducting business in a low or 
no tax jurisdiction, the profit obtained from that enterprise would have to be taxed at the 
level of the parent company, a ‘normal’ or ‘high’ tax jurisdiction (in a form of ‘switch-
over’) 
 The OECD itself recognizes a series of elements that should be observed in order 
for a proposal like this to effectively work.101 Besides, it was a surprise for us not to see 
the concern, at the body of the Public Consultation Document, of discussions on how to 
harmonize the tax base. 
 Even today, some countries have a nominal high tax rate but, due to other elements 
in their domestic tax laws and the rules on the determination of the base, the effective tax 
rate turns out to be low or zero102. Without a minimum harmonization of the norms on 
the determination of the tax base, the ‘income inclusion rule’ would be ineffective. 
 Furthermore, we are against such a proposal. We believe that other instruments 
under the BEPS Action Plan, such as the rules against treaty abuse (Action 6103) or the 
rules against artificial arrangements (contained in several of the Actions) could more 
efficiently deal with this problem, without adding unnecessary complexity and without 
raising questions about tax sovereignty, for instance. 
                                                          
100 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Public Consultation Document. Addressing 
the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy (Paris, France, 2019). 
101 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Public Consultation Document. Addressing 
the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy (Paris, France, 2019). 
102 Malta is a very good example of our statement, see: “Taxation and Investment in Malta 2014: Reach, 
Relevance and Reliability”, Deloitte, accessed 2019 July 16, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-maltaguide-2014.pdf. 
103 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits 
in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - 2015 Final Report (Paris, France, 2015). 
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4.2.2: Tax on base eroding payments 
 
 This proposal is to be compared with an ‘equalization levy’ and has been included 
into several domestic (unilateral) measures to tax the digital economy. It consists, 
basically, on a protection measure to be taken by one jurisdiction, when the other involved 
in the company`s operation, does not comply with the standards for preventing base 
erosion and profit shifting. According to the proposal, would include:  
‘an undertaxed payments rule that would deny a deduction for a payment 
to a related party if that payment was not subject to tax at a minimum 
rate; and  
a subject to tax rule in tax treaties that would only grant certain treaty 
benefits if the item of income is sufficiently taxed in the other state.’104 
 This proposal also faces important theoretical issues. Firstly, the ‘minimum rate’ 
described at the first bullet point would have to be set in a consensus base and would 
undermine the tax sovereignty of countries105. More than that, we believe that this 
proposal would also affect real (substantial) business, not only artificial arrangements, as 
there are businesses been performed with real economic reasons in low tax jurisdictions.  
The same negative effect upon substantial business would be verified with the 
type of ‘limitation of benefits’ clause based merely on the nominal (or even effective) tax 
rate applicable. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
104 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Public Consultation Document. Addressing 
the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy (Paris, France, 2019), 28.  
105 We strongly believe that this is a very relevant issue to consider and that, in accordance with De Wilde, 
we believe that without fiscal sovereignty a country simply cannot function. See: Maarten de Wilde, “Some 
Thoughts on a Fair Allocation of Corporate Tax in a Globalizing Economy.” Intertax, 38, 5 (2010), 281-
281. 
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Chapter 5: EU Proposals for Taxing the Digital Economy 
 
 Differently from the perspective of the proposals developed by the OECD (see 
topic above), the ones on the table of the European Union counts on the bounding effects 
of the EU law upon its Member States. Of course, the TFUE does not precisely define 
que extent of the Union’s competence in matters of direct taxation, nevertheless, as solidly 
established in case law106, the ‘competence with preemption’107 of EU in this regard is 
connected to safeguarding the internal market, as defined in Art.4(2)(a) of the TFEU. 
 Therefore, the interference of the EU in the tax policy of the member states occurs, 
mainly, by the adoption of directives (secondary source of the EU law108) as to harmonize 
the tax system inside the block. On the other hand, also decisions (case law; ‘negative 
integration’) constitute an important source of EU law, especially in terms of direct 
taxation, nevertheless, this sphere lies outside the scope of our studies. 
 We should use these inaugural considerations on the topic related to the 
implementation issues of our proposal (Topic 7.1). 
 Nowadays, the EU (mainly through the work of the EC) has several ambitious 
proposals to adjust the international tax system (or the Unions tax system), highly 
connected to the development of the BEPS Project, as several of the main players at the 
OECD/G20 are European countries.  
                                                          
106 See: Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer, EU:C:2005:763 and Case C-279/93, Schumacker, 
EU:C:1995:31. 
107 Rita Szudoczky and Dennis Weber, “Chapter 2: Constitutional Foundations: EU Tax Competences; 
Legal Basis for Tax Integration; Sources and Enactment of EU Tax Law” in Terra/Wattel European Tax 
Law: Volume 1 General Topics and Direct Taxation, Peter J. Wattel, Otto Marres and Hein Vermeulen 
(Deventer, the Netherlands: 7th Ed., Wolters Kluwer, 2018). 
108 Rita Szudoczky and Dennis Weber, “Constitutional Foundations: EU Tax Competences; Legal Basis for 
Tax Integration; Sources and Enactment of EU Tax Law” in Terra/Wattel European Tax Law: Volume 1 
General Topics and Direct Taxation, Peter J. Wattel, Otto Marres and Hein Vermeulen (Deventer, the 
Netherlands: 7th Ed., Wolters Kluwer, 2018), 12. 
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 Besides the already adopted directives109, the EC have proposed directives to 
implement the (C)CCTB110, although facing some political barriers. For our studies, after 
these brief considerations, we should look upon the EC proposals specifically design to 
face the challenges of the digital economy. These proposals are, to say so, the parallel of 
the proposals analyzed at Chapter 4. 
 On an interesting press release, the EC summarized the two ongoing (and 
complementary) proposals that we should now focus. Please, notice the wording below: 
‘What is the Commission proposing? 
The Commission has made two legislative proposals: 
The first initiative aims to reform corporate tax rules so that profits are 
registered and taxed where businesses have significant interaction with 
users through digital channels. This forms the Commission's preferred 
long-term solution. 
                                                          
109 European Parliament and the European Council, “Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 November 2011 
on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different 
Member States”; European Parliament and the European Council, “Council Directive 2009/133/EC of 19 
October 2009 on the common system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, partial divisions, transfers 
of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies of different Member States and to the transfer of 
the registered office of an SE or SCE between Member States.”; European Parliament and the European 
Council, “Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to 
interest and royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member States.”; European 
Parliament and the European Council, “Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down 
rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market”. For a 
comprehensive study of the main directives: Otto Marres, “Chapter 6 (Update): The Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive.” In Terra/Wattel European Tax Law: Volume 1 General Topics and Direct Taxation, Peter J. 
Wattel, Otto Marres and Hein Vermeulen (Deventer, the Netherlands: 7th Ed., Wolters Kluwer, 2018); 
Frederik Boulogne, “Chapter 7 (Updated): The Tax Merger Directive” in Terra/Wattel European Tax Law: 
Volume 1 General Topics and Direct Taxation, Peter J. Wattel, Otto Marres and Hein Vermeulen (Deventer, 
the Netherlands: 7th Ed., Wolters Kluwer, 2018); Pasquale Pistone, “Chapter 8: EU Cross-Border Tax 
Disputes Settlement” in Terra/Wattel European Tax Law: Volume 1 General Topics and Direct Taxation, 
Peter J. Wattel, Otto Marres and Hein Vermeulen (Deventer, the Netherlands: 7th Ed., Wolters Kluwer, 
2018); Axel Cordewener, “Chapter 10 (Updated): The Intertest and Royalty Directive” in Terra/Wattel 
European Tax Law: Volume 1 General Topics and Direct Taxation, Peter J. Wattel, Otto Marres and Hein 
Vermeulen (Deventer, the Netherlands: 7th Ed., Wolters Kluwer, 2018); Daniël Smit, “Chapter 12: The 
Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD)” in Terra/Wattel European Tax Law: Volume 1 General Topics 
and Direct Taxation, Peter J. Wattel, Otto Marres and Hein Vermeulen (Deventer, the Netherlands: 7th Ed., 
Wolters Kluwer, 2018). 
110 European Commission, “Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base, 
Strasbourg, 25.10.2016 COM (2016) 685 final, 2016/0337 (CNS). (Strasbourg, France, 2016). European 
Commission, “Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
Strasbourg, 25.10.2016 COM (2016) 683 final 2016/0336 (CNS). (Strasbourg, France, 2016).  
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 The second proposal responds to calls from several Member States for 
an interim tax which covers the main digital activities that currently 
escape tax altogether in the EU.’111 
 We should now concentrate in the discussions of each one of these proposals. 
5.1: Significant digital presence proposal 
 
 The European Commission presented a proposal to implement a common policy 
to face the tax challenges of the digital economy among all its Member States, which the 
final document was presented in Brussels, 2018112. According to the Explanatory 
Memorandum of the Directive Proposal, the rationale of the policy in study is the 
following: 
‘This proposal aims at addressing the issues raised by the digital economy 
by setting out a comprehensive solution within the existing Member 
States' corporate tax systems. It provides a common system for taxing 
digital activities in the EU which properly takes into account the features 
of the digital economy.   
First, this proposal lays down rules for establishing a taxable 
nexus for digital businesses operating across border in case of a non-
physical commercial presence (hereinafter: a "significant digital 
presence"). New indicators for such a significant digital presence are 
required in order to establish and protect Member States' taxing rights in 
relation to the new digitalised business models.  
Second, this proposal sets out principles for attributing profits to 
a digital business. These principles should better capture the value 
creation of digital business models which highly rely on intangible 
assets.’113 
                                                          
111“Fair Taxation of the Digital Economy”, European Commission, accessed 2019 July 14, 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/fair-taxation-digital-economy_en. For an 
overview of the two proposals, see: Aleksandra Bal, “(Mis)guided by the Value Creation Principle – Can 
New Concepts Solve Old Problems.” Bulletin for International Taxation, 72, 11 (2018): 6 p. 
112 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate 
taxation of a significant digital presence, COM (2018) 147 final; 2018/0072 (CNS) (Brussels, Belgium, 
2018). 
113 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate 
taxation of a significant digital presence, COM (2018) 147 final; 2018/0072 (CNS) (Brussels, Belgium, 
2018), 2. 
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 In comparison to the proposals presented by the OECD, the EU’s has a more 
developed stage of technicalities, although based on a similar idea of ‘significant 
economic presence’ (Topic 4.1.3). Therefore, this presence would be measured according 
to the elements described in Article 4(3), in verbis: 
‘A ‘significant digital presence’ shall be considered to exist in a Member 
State in a tax period if the business carried on through it consists wholly 
or partly of the supply of digital services through a digital interface and 
one or more of the following conditions is met with respect to the supply 
of those services by the entity carrying on that business, taken together 
with the supply of any such services through a digital interface by each 
of that entity's associated enterprises in aggregate:  
(a) the proportion of total revenues obtained in that tax period and 
resulting from the supply of those digital services to users located in that 
Member State in that tax period exceeds EUR 7 000 000;  
(b) the number of users of one or more of those digital services who are 
located in that Member State in that tax period exceeds 100 000;  
(c) the number of business contracts for the supply of any such digital 
service that are concluded in that tax period by users located in that 
Member State exceeds 3 000.”114 
 The proposal is based on the existence of at least one of the three elements 
described in letters (a), (b) and (c). The first element is connected to the verification of 
the revenue obtained by the non-resident in another (source) Member State, through the 
exercise of a ‘covered’ activity (a digital service). This element seems the most adequate 
to be taken into account when dealing with income taxation, because of the nature of the 
tax itself. 
 The problem, we believe, lies connected to the ‘absolute’ value imposed by the 
directive. On the one hand, we understand the goal to archive simplification and, more 
importantly, to provide for uniformization inside the EU. On the other side, though, we 
believe that this digital tax presence should be measured in proportional terms – on the 
                                                          
114 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate 
taxation of a significant digital presence, COM (2018) 147 final; 2018/0072 (CNS) (Brussels, Belgium, 
2018), Art.4(3). 
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percentage of the global (or European, for the purposes of the directive) revenue that the 
company obtain in the source state. Our proposal should walk in that path. 
 Finally, if thinking on the creation of a global solution, the application of a fixed 
and unique value could bring problems in terms of the possibility to accommodate 
national and regional economic differences.  
 Although we agree with the first element, we are against the application of any of 
the other two. The second one is linked to the number of users of the given digital service. 
The EU, when stating that only one of the three elements is necessary for the application 
of a digital service tax, managed to escape from the mistake made by the OECD (in our 
point of view) in the ‘user participation’ proposal, because the former is able to 
‘understand’ that not every digital business relies on user participation. 
 The problem of letter (b), nevertheless, lies in the presumption that every single 
user contributes to the creation of value for the enterprise in the same way. Of course, any 
feasible solution to be adopted must deal with simplification or objectification, 
nevertheless, the levels of contributions provided by each user can drastically differ. 
 Firstly, the Proposal does not provide for instruments capable of distinguishing 
‘active’ and ‘passive’ users. Secondly, even inside the same jurisdictions, active users can 
have significant different impact in the value creation, simply imagine a famous football 
player and a common student.  
Thirdly, because of the large economic differences between countries (and, also, 
Member States, inside the scope of the Proposal) 100.000 users in country A can provide 
for much more value created than the same 100.000 users in jurisdiction B, where, for 
instance, paid online advertising would be cheaper. Last but not least, the application of 
an absolute number of users raises huge distortions. Imagine that country A has a 
population of 10.000.000 and that country B has a population of 1.000.000. The idea of 
‘significant’, in this case, would be considered to be of only 0,01% of the population of 
Country A, while of 0,1% in country B. 
In regard of letter (c), the problem would be more or less the same, especially in 
regard to the first, second and third commentaries above. In this point, the thing that most 
called our attention, though, is the lack of importance of the values of the contracts, which 
is only mitigated by the presence of the threshold of letter (a). 
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 For a second step, the EU Commission Directive Proposal also tackles the issue 
of the attribution of taxing rights upon these new ‘captured’ activities. Although we shall 
present some disagreement with the strategies adopted, we believe that the approach of 
the EU is, to say so, in the correct direction. We will come back to that question in Part 
III, while presenting our proposal. 
 Article 5 states that: 
‘1. The profits that are attributable to or in respect of a significant digital 
presence in a Member State shall be taxable within the corporate tax 
framework of that Member State only.  
2. The profits attributable to or in respect of the significant digital 
presence shall be those that the digital presence would have earned if it 
had been a separate and independent enterprise performing the same or 
similar activities under the same or similar conditions, in particular in its 
dealings with other parts of the enterprise, taking into account the 
functions performed, assets used and risks assumed, through a digital 
interface. 
3. For the purposes of paragraph 2 the determination of profits 
attributable to or in respect of the significant digital presence shall be 
based on a functional analysis. In order to determine the functions of, and 
attribute the economic ownership of assets and risks to, the significant 
digital presence, the economically significant activities performed by 
such presence through a digital interface shall be taken into account. For 
this purpose, activities undertaken by the enterprise through a digital 
interface related to data or users shall be considered economically 
significant activities of the significant digital presence which attribute 
risks and the economic ownership of assets to such presence.  
4. In determining the attributable profits under paragraph 2, due account 
shall be taken of the economically significant activities performed by the 
significant digital presence which are relevant to the development, 
enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the 
enterprise’s intangible assets.  
5. The economically significant activities performed by the significant 
digital presence through a digital interface include, inter alia, the 
following activities:  
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(a) the collection, storage, processing, analysis, deployment and sale of 
user-level data;  
(b) the collection, storage, processing and display of user-generated 
content;  
(c) the sale of online advertising space;  
(d) the making available of third-party created content on a digital 
marketplace;  
(e) the supply of any digital service not listed in points (a) to (d).  
6. In determining the attributable profits under paragraphs 1 to 4, 
taxpayers shall use the profit split method unless the taxpayer proves that 
an alternative method based on internationally accepted principles is 
more appropriate having regard to the results of the functional analysis. 
The splitting factors may include expenses incurred for research, 
development and marketing as well as the number of users and data 
collected per Member State.’115 
 According to the Proposal, therefore, all the profit attributable to the digital service 
provide in a given Member State should be taxed by the latter. In other terms, there would 
be full taxation of that given profit at the level of the source country, in a similar way to 
what is now a practice in terms of physical permanent establishments. Our proposal deals 
with the problem differently, therefore, we should leave this discussion for Chapter 6. 
 The second important aspect, from Article 5, is that it defends the maintenance of 
the application of the arm’s length principle and, consequently, the idea of transfer 
pricing. It is also stated that the determination of the profit attributable to these new 
activities should also respect the analysis of functions, assets and risks assumed. Although 
we believe it is implicit from the context of the Proposal, no direct mention was made, in 
Article 5, about the possibility to disregard the evaluation of the number of employees as 
an indicator of substance inside the functional analysis. We believe that, in the eyes of 
the Proposal, this ‘number’ should not necessarily be taken into account.    
                                                          
115 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate 
taxation of a significant digital presence, COM (2018) 147 final; 2018/0072 (CNS) (Brussels, Belgium, 
2018). Art.5. 
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Although we agree, in general, with the wording of this Article and the option for 
the maintenance of the arm’s length principle, we do not see how it would be applied to 
some of the ‘digital activities’ in the scope of the Proposal, namely the mere collection of 
data and user-generated content (Art.5(5)). In this regard, especially in the cases of letters 
(a) and (b), we believe that taxing the mere collection or storage of data or user-generated 
content, to the extent it is not been negotiated to any third party or to any other company 
inside the group, is outside the scope of an income tax.  
Our proposal should deal with this apparent problem (Topic 6.1). Although, in a 
nutshell, we are against taxation of raw data and we believe that, if countries actually 
decide to tax it, they will have to face extra challenges in terms of transfer pricing 
application. 
Finally, it is also important to highlight that Article 5 above expressly mentions a 
hierarchy in the choosing of a TP method, namely, with the preference for the adoption 
of the ‘profit split method’116. We believe, therefore, that in practice, if adopted, the 
Proposal would impose a ‘burden of prove’ to the taxpayer that, for some reason, decides 
to adopt another TP method, namely be saying the reasons why not choosing the ‘profit 
split method’. 
This approach differs from the current wording of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, but some countries, domestically, already impose a hierarchy among 
applicable transfer pricing methods, such as Russian Federation117 and Mexico118. On the 
opposite way, countries, such as Brazil119, can provide for a wider range of freedom in 
the determination of methods to be adopted by the taxpayer (broader than those provided 
at the Guidelines120). 
5.2: Common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting from the 
provision of certain digital services proposal 
 
                                                          
116 For a deeper understanding of the ‘profit split method’: Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (Paris, 
France, 2017), 133-145. 
117 Russian Federation, “Tax Code of the Russian Federation.”, Art.105.7-105.13. 
118 Mexico, “Mexican Income Tax Law”, Art.180. 
119 Brazil, “Law No. 9.430/1996”, Art. 18, 18-A, 19, and 19-A. 
120 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (Paris, France, 2017). 
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 This Proposal, presented at the same context (and day) as the previous one, can be 
compared to the proposals elaborated under pillar two of the OCDE Public Consultation 
Document, provided that they are inserted into the context of directly counter attacking 
BEPS. 
 As explored in the previous topic, this proposal is also at a more technically 
developed stage, in comparison to the work done so far by the OECD. The scope of this 
activity is to tax the provision of digital services, especially those relying on the 
importance of user participation. According to Article 3(1), the following digital services 
would fall into the scope of the Directive: 
‘services consisting in the placing on a digital interface of advertising 
targeted at users of that interface; as well as the transmission of data 
collected about users which has been generated from such users' activities 
on digital interfaces; 
services consisting in the making available of multi-sided digital 
interfaces to users, which may also be referred to as "intermediation 
services", which allow users to find other users and to interact with them, 
and which may also facilitate the provision of underlying supplies of 
goods or services directly between users.’121 
Additionally, high minimum thresholds would apply in order to qualify a given 
provider of digital services as a taxable person in terms of the new digital service tax 
(DST). According to Article 4 of the Directive proposal, these thresholds would be, 
combined: 
‘The total amount of worldwide revenues reported by the entity for the 
latest complete financial year for which a financial statement is available 
exceeds EUR 750 000 000; and  
the total amount of taxable revenues obtained by the entity within the 
Union during that financial year exceeds EUR 50 000 000.’122 
                                                          
121 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the common system of a digital services tax 
on revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services, COM/2018/0148 final - 2018/073 
(CNS) (Brussels, Belgium, 2018), Art. 3(1). 
122 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the common system of a digital services tax 
on revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services, COM/2018/0148 final - 2018/073 
(CNS) (Brussels, Belgium, 2018), Art. 4. 
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 The application of such high thresholds translates into what we believe to be a 
significantly ring-fencing measure, provided that the tax would exclusively apply to 
highly digitalized and successful enterprises. This could ultimately harm future 
developments of digital innovation and does not seem to be a reasonable strategy to be 
adopted.  
 Moreover, the proposal aims at establishing a fixed rate, to be applied by all EU 
Member States (3%)123. This last element makes the EU proposal even more problematic 
in terms of tax sovereignty than OECD`s Income Inclusion proposal, under Pillar II 
(Topic 4.2.1). Although already hard to be implemented in the EU territory, a similar 
fixed rate proposal would most likely be reject at a global level.  
 Besides, in accordance with Article 3(2), the tax would be levied in a gross base, 
which give raise to problems relating to neutrality, provided that less digitalized business 
may be subject to net taxation, specially under the laws in force in the EU. 
 It could also be argued that this proposal creates a tax designed specifically for a 
determined (and fairly small) group of taxpayers and, thus, not been general. Even beyond 
the several theoretical problems identified, this proposal would have a very limited scope 
and, therefore, would be incapable of addressing the issue it is supposed to in a 
satisfactory comprehensive manner.  
 Finally, the nature of the DST would definitely escape from the ‘income taxation’ 
and would be a tax on turnover124. This issue was also identified by Hohenwarter, Kofler, 
Mayr and Sinnig125, who states that it would cause this tax to be outside of the scope of 
most DTT, provided the wording of Article 2 of the OECD Model Convention.  
Ultimately, it would lead to an uncoordinated international implementation of the 
tax and several problems related to it. It would also be difficult to combine its application 
                                                          
123 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the common system of a digital services tax 
on revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services, COM/2018/0148 final - 2018/073 
(CNS) (Brussels, Belgium, 2018), Art. 8. 
124  Yariv Brauner, “Editorial: Taxing the Digital Economy Post-BEPS, Seriously”. Intertax, 46, 6/7 (2018), 
462. Also, Roland Ismer and Christoph Jescheck, “Debate: Taxes on Digital Services and the Substantive 
Scope of Application of Tax Treaties: Pushing the Boundaries of Article 2 of the OECD Model?” Intertax, 
46, 6/7 (2018), 573. 
125 Daniela Hohenwarter, Georg Kofler, Gunter Mayr and Julia Sinnig, “Guest editorial: Qualification of 
the Digital Services Tax Under Tax Treaties”. Intertax, 47, 2 (2019), 140. 
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through the MLI, as we believe should be an interesting way of implementing the changes 
needed. 
The fact that this proposal is aimed to be an interim measure does not substantially 
change our opinion in its regard. Specially if thinking in a global level adoption of a 
similar proposal, probably, the difficulties in implementing it would be even greater than 
implementing an ‘nexus-based’ solution, as we advocate. 
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Part III  
Our Proposal 
Chapter 6: Rationale 
 
6.1: Virtual Permanent Establishment 
 
 The first element to be considered is the need to establish a taxing right upon 
the development of non-physical activities in countries besides the residence of the 
company126. This need comes as a consequence of the observed concerns of the 
international community to adequate the international tax system to the new reality of the 
digital economy. 
Although not all scholars believe in the success of a proposal based on the idea of 
(re)aligning taxation with value creation, our proposal should follow that goal, for the 
reasoning built during this study. 
Nevertheless, we recognize that, even among those several scholars and 
international institutions in favor of aligning taxation with value creation, there are 
divergences on matters of which activities should have the ‘rules changed’ and which 
tools to use in order to change the tax treatment of these activities127. Of course, this 
divergence is also highlighted on the divergence on the determination of a precise 
meaning (and length) of the idea of ‘value creation’. 
We have explored some of these new ideas and identified proposals posed by 
relevant stakeholders, especially connected to the OECD and the EU.  
Therefore, based on the analysis made upon these other proposals, we suggest to 
tackle the tax challenges of the digitalization of the economy through the elaboration of 
changes inside the scope of the corporate income tax and, thus, we do not believe on a 
successful application of measures, even if interim, based on the equalization levy (low 
                                                          
126 This need appears connected to a modern interpretation of the ‘benefit theory’, as an assimilation to the 
idea of economic allegiance, as mentioned by us in topic 3.1. See Ana Paula Dourado, “Editorial: In Search 
of an International Tax System in a Post-BEPS Tax Competition Setting.” Intertax, 47, 1 (2019), 2. 
127 Ana Paula Dourado, “Debate: Digital Taxation Opens the Pandora Box: The OECD Interim Report and 
the European Commission Proposals.” Intertax, 46, 6/7 (2018), 565. 
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rates turnover taxes128) specifically applicable to some digital services. The reasons 
underling our opinion can be found at Topic 5.2 above. Consequently, we also do not 
believe on the feasibility of the abandonment of income taxes and the ‘take over’ of 
indirect taxation.   
As we are going to debate in Topic 7.1 (Implementation), the introduction of 
measures to deal with the challenges presented through an ‘income tax’ would make it 
much easier to be globally adopted and effective, provided the mechanisms to include 
them in the web of DTT, especially because of Article 2 of the OECD Model Convention. 
After advocating in favor of the maintenance of the income taxation, we defend 
that it should also continue to be ‘nexus-based’.  
With that in mind, our solution must be found on the creation of another type of 
permanent establishment which does not require a physical presence at the source 
country. Therefore, every corporate income tax imposed would rely on the existence of a 
‘taxable presence’, in line with the principle of legality and certainty.129 
Contrary to this position are Devereux and Vella, who suggest the application of 
a more ‘fixed element’ based taxation, such as attributing the taxing rights to the 
jurisdiction where the shareholders are located130. We disagree with this opinion both on 
a theoretical and practical standpoint. Firstly, because it distorts the idea of economic 
allegiance and the benefit theory131, thus, does not align taxation with value (income) 
creation. Secondly, because it would ultimately empty the taxable income in developing 
countries, leading to an unsustainable global share of taxing rights. 
Therefore, we reinforce our idea on the need to maintain the existing ‘nexus’, to 
maintain the application of the concept of permanent establishment and, besides, to link 
                                                          
128 Yariv Brauner, “Editorial: Taxing the Digital Economy Post-BEPS, Seriously”. Intertax, 46, 6/7 (2018), 
462. 
129 The exceptions would be maintained for the particular cases of royalties and interest, for example, as 
provided for in current tax treaties, but these are considered to be capital income and not technically 
business income, therefore, lying outside of the scope of this study. 
130 Michael P. Devereux and John Vella, “Debate: Implications of Digitalization for International Corporate 
Tax Reform.” Intertax, 46, 6/7 (2018), 550. 
131 According to Hongler and Pistone, even without a physical presence, a company acting in a given state 
benefits from structures such as internet infrastructure, energy supply, a functioning legal system, etc. Peter 
Hongler and Pasquale Pistone, “Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business Income in the Era of 
Digital Economy.” IBDF Whitepapers (2015), 24. As for Ana Paula Dourado, the idea that taxes must be 
connected to the obtention of a benefit lies in matters of justice, as can be read in the author’s early writings. 
Ana Paula Dourado, “Justiça e Redistribuição Financeira” in Ética e o Futuro da Democracia (Lisboa, 
Portugal: Edições Colibri, 1998), 330. 
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the latter with the idea of ‘source’. Consequently, we are in favor to exclude the use of 
expressions such as ‘market jurisdiction’ or ‘user jurisdiction’, for the reasons we have 
already debated in Chapter 3132.Therefore, for example, our proposal is more able to also 
capture the digital presence of intermediary functions of a MCG, generating value not at 
the residence country nor at the ‘market’ or ‘final user’ jurisdiction. 
 We call this new type of permanent establishment a ‘virtual permanent 
establishment’.  
The threshold for the acquisition of the virtual PE status would be based on an 
idea of a significant economic presence133. This significant economic presence, 
nevertheless, should be as more objectified as possible, otherwise, we could end up 
increasing tax uncertainty, litigation and administrative costs, as well as failing in the 
prevention (or reduction) of aggressive tax planning possibilities. 
On the other side, this objectification will also have to deal properly with the 
danger of turning into an oversimplification and a disregard of the factual situation in 
practical cases (we will address this concern while discussing the implementation issues). 
 The early challenges that we should begin with are related to how to determine 
the nature of the activities that would be included in the concept of ‘economic presence’ 
and, therefore, which activities would have the tax regime modified134. We must also bear 
in mind that the nature of these activities must be in line with the nature of the tax in study 
(business income tax).  
                                                          
132 Surely, the determination of the significant economic presence, as discussed in the following, should 
include some elements related to the market or user/consumers base, nevertheless, one cannot mistakenly 
assume that market and/or user/consumer jurisdiction will always coincide to be the source state. This 
misuse appears, for instance, in the work of Spinosa and Chand, where the authors defend a short-term 
maintenance of the current nexus but constantly refers to the expression of ‘market jurisdiction’ as 
synonymous to ‘source jurisdiction’. Lisa Spinosa and Vikram Chand, ‘A Long-Term Solution for Taxing 
Digitalized Business Models: Should the Permanent Establishment Definition Be Modified to Resolve the 
Issue or Should the Focus Be on a Shared Taxing Rights Mechanism?’, Intertax, 46, 6/7 (2018), 476.   
133 Differently than Chand and Spinosa, we believe that both the ‘new virtual permanent establishment 
nexus’ and what the authors call a ‘significant economic presence test’ can (and should) be implemented 
together as part of a comprehensive solution. Lisa Spinosa and Vikram Chand, ‘A Long-Term Solution for 
Taxing Digitalized Business Models: Should the Permanent Establishment Definition Be Modified to 
Resolve the Issue or Should the Focus Be on a Shared Taxing Rights Mechanism?’, Intertax, 46, 6/7 (2018), 
476. 
134 Chapter 7 will elaborate on our though that the modified rules to be applied to the ‘virtual permanent 
establishment’ should not be extended to the current physical PE types. 
71 
 
 In this regard, the OECD ‘significant economic presence proposal’, when dealing 
with the drawing of the nature of the activities to be ‘captured’ by the new rules, gives 
six elements which could be considered individually or combined: 
‘(1) the existence of a user base and the associated data input; 
(2) the volume of digital content derived from the jurisdiction; 
(3) billing and collection in local currency or with a local form of 
payment;  
(4) the maintenance of a website in a local language; 
(5) responsibility for the final delivery of goods to customers or the 
provision by the enterprise of other support services such as after-sales 
service or repairs and maintenance; or   
(6)  sustained marketing and sales promotion activities, either online or 
otherwise, to attract customers.’135 
We have already discussed these elements when focusing on the mentioned 
proposal. Please, refer to Topic 4.1.3. 
The IBFD Task Force on the Digital Economy, in their input to the Public 
Consultation held by the OECD in Paris, March 2019, expressed the support to a 
cumulative use of such indicators, or elements136. We, on the opposite direction, reject 
the use of any of these methods to verify the nature of the activities to be captured by the 
new permanent establishment type.  
 In our opinion, we reinforce, revenue should be the central element guiding the 
development of the ‘virtual permanent establishment’, otherwise, inevitably, we would 
be leaving the field of corporate income tax or, at least, we would be ring-fencing the 
digital economy beyond what is needed or even desired. 
 Therefore, the activity should be digital (virtual) and capable of directly 
generating revenue. 
                                                          
135 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Public Consultation Document. Addressing 
the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy (Paris, France, 2019). 
136 Pasquale Pistone; João Félix Pinto Nogueira and Betty Andrade. “Comments submitted by The 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) Task Force on the Digital Economy,” (OECD, Paris, 
2019), 44. 
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 The first requirement, for our selected ‘nature determining’ element is that the 
activity should be virtual, even if connected to a physical permanent establishment. This 
is in line with our idea that the new rules must not be extended to physical permanent 
establishments (see Chapter 7). 
 Secondly, we used the expression ‘capable’ because it may actually not generate 
a revenue, but the activity, in a given period, may be seen as loss making. As in regular 
‘physical permanent establishments’, the new ‘virtual’ threshold should be able to 
accommodate the acceptance and distribution of losses. This particular point is surely one 
full of challenges and practical obstacles, therefore, Topic 7.3 will make some brief 
considerations in this regard. 
 Besides, the term ‘directly’ means that the activity itself may generate the revenue 
and not, for instance, an indirect creation of value via user participation or network 
effects. 
 The activity deemed to create a ‘virtual permanent establishment’ should be 
developed either by the enterprise itself or by a dependent agent, as it is today. Users can 
(and do) create value, but we believe this value lies outside the scope of direct taxes. 
Moreover, if compared to more traditional business models, the users can be distantly 
associated to independent agents. Although they create value for the company, their 
activities cannot be deemed to be considered as activities of the enterprise. 
Finally, the idea of ‘generating revenue’ holds an obvious connection to the nature 
of the tax in study.   
Another important aspect that we believe should not be changed is the fact that 
the mere collection or ‘self-storage’ of data must not be included in the activities enabling 
the creation of a virtual PE. A difference that is rarely made in academic papers is the one 
between ‘raw data’ and ‘processed and monetized data’137.  
                                                          
137 Petruzzi and Buriak highlight the necessity to consider the ‘collection, elaboration and exploitation’ of 
data for there to be an imposition of income tax connected to it. We believe that this idea lies closely to 
ours in terms of taxing data only by the time it generates revenue. With the considerations of the mentioned 
authors, data can also be taxed in a net base, considering the costs incurred in the process of collecting, 
elaborating and exploiting the given data. Raffaele Petruzzi and Svitlana Buriak, “Addressing the Tax 
Challenges of the Digitalization of the Economy – A Possible Answer in the Proper Application of the 
Transfer Pricing Rules?”, Bulletin for International Taxation, 72, 4a, Special Edition (2018). 
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Data should be seen as the basic raw material of the digital age, just like iron or 
wood are for the traditional industry. The mere possession of these materials should not 
be subject to tax. Contrarily is the case where these materials are brought or sold, for 
instance. 
To deal with raw data differently than other core raw materials would be extremely 
ring-fencing and would, as already mentioned by us, shift the nature of the income tax. 
As discussed in Part II of this study, we also believe that data and user 
participation are generally responsible for the increase in revenue making activities of the 
MCG in the locations where, respectively, they are gathered and where the users are 
located. Our new permanent establishment threshold will, therefore, be able to capture 
this value by the time they generate revenue in these other states, regardless of a physical 
presence. 
Finally, we consider that no human function (or no substantial, nor major human 
function), in loco, should be needed for the activity to be verified in a certain jurisdiction. 
In this case, the ‘significant people function’ does not need to be undertaken by people in 
the PE jurisdiction, but by someone in the MGC outsourced to do so, by distance and 
even not formally working at the PE in question138. Moreover, the number of employees 
would not necessarily determine the extension of the profits attributable to the PE, as 
more and more AI can be applied in generating revenue, together with very limited (and 
specialized) human labor force. 
This would, for instance, enable cloud computing activities to be captured by the 
new PE threshold, as well as software installation facilities. Of course, technical studies 
must be carried out for tax authorities and taxpayers to have more certainty as to the where 
some cloud activities, for instance, are taking place, especially when dealing with multi-
sided business activities. This point should be strengthened for the taxation of cloud 
computing to be more effective.  
The problem of determining the place where activities, such as the former, are 
taking place, is called ‘source conundrum’. In the words of Carlo Garbarino: 
                                                          
138 Lisa Spinosa and Vikram Chand, “A Long-Term Solution for Taxing Digitalized Business Models: 
Should the Permanent Establishment Definition Be Modified to Resolve the Issue or Should the Focus Be 
on a Shared Taxing Rights Mechanism?”, Intertax, 46, 6/7 (2018), 476. 
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‘The source conundrum is precisely locating the place of the income-
generating activity and identifying the link between taxation and where 
economic activity takes place.’139 
Therefore, considering all the statements made in this topic, we are confident that 
the new virtual permanent establishment threshold would be able to capture revenues 
obtained digitally by online social media; search engines; online marketplaces and cloud 
computing, as well as intermediary activities, mainly developed in a B2B scenario140. The 
scope of our proposal, therefore, seems to be broader than the current main OECD and 
EU proposals, although, ours would still need sided strategies to tackle the source 
conundrum issue, as the others under analysis. 
As is it is going to be debated in Topic 6.2, the aspects of functions developed, 
assets used and risks undertaken are also very important to determine the existence and 
wider of the new virtual permanent establishment, as they should continue to be 
responsible for the determination of the amount of revenue created in connection to the 
new PE. 
After determining the question of the ‘economic presence’, which is basically a 
matter of the ‘nature’ of the enterprise (or activity), it is also important to evaluate whether 
this activity is significant enough as to trigger the new PE threshold. This discussion is 
developed at the following topic.  
6.2: Determination of profits attributable to the ‘to be verified’ virtual 
permanent establishment (Transfer Pricing) 
 
 After the analysis of the methods proposed by several of the players in the 
international taxation scenario for the attribution of profits to the ‘to be verified’ (or 
‘possible’) source state permanent establishment, namely the methods of the ‘residual 
profit split’, ‘formulary apportionment’, ‘fixed allocation key’, ‘transfer pricing’ (‘arm’s 
                                                          
139 Carlo Garbarino, “Permanent Establishments and BEPS Action 7: Perspectives in Evolution.” Intertax, 
47, 4. (2019), 367. 
140 Even Hongler and Pistone admit that the application of an ‘user threshold’, as defended by some of the 
proposals analyzed at this study, would have a less significant impact in B2B operations than in B2C. We 
do believe that it would be another issue connected to this threshold. Peter Hongler and Pasquale Pistone, 
“Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business Income in the Era of Digital Economy.” IBDF 
Whitepapers (2015), 3. 
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length principle’) and even gross income taxation, we have elaborated the considerations 
that follow. 
 Firstly, to identify how much of value is being created at the source state level, we 
should consider the functions performed, assets used and risks assumed, as mentioned in 
the previous topic. In this regard, we believe on the maintenance of the use of transfer 
pricing rules, from which we would still need to make some adjustments, although not 
under the scope of this study.141 
 More specifically, in order to be more accurate in the determination of this profit, 
we believe on the application of the ‘profit split method’, as defined at the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines142. 
 On the other hand, some relevant arguments are presented against the use of 
transfer pricing rules. The first lies on the fact that they would be unable to measure some 
value creating activities, namely the user participation. We agree with that impossibility 
(or, at least, this great difficulty), but, on the other hand, we believe that taxing these 
activities would have several negative consequences, as extensively addressed. 
 Moreover, we are not denning that value can be created by several activities 
outside the thresholds set at Topic 6.1 above, but we advocate that not every value created 
should be taxed in terms of business income taxation or, broadly speaking, in terms of 
direct taxation.  
 User participation usually translates into the increasing of business being 
conducted in the jurisdiction where those users are located, which also attracts more 
revenues in terms of indirect taxation. 
 On the other hand, in the less common cases where this user engagement is not 
translated into the increase of local business, so we believe no income taxation should be 
levied, by the simple fact that no (or very few) income is been generated from that 
                                                          
141 Similarly: Petruzzi and Svitlana Buriak, “Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalization of the 
Economy – A Possible Answer in the Proper Application of the Transfer Pricing Rules?”, Bulletin for 
International Taxation, 72, 4a, Special Edition (2018). 
142 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (Paris, France, 2017), 133-145. 
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valuable asset. We cannot, at least not in the scope of income taxation, tax a profit not yet 
incurred.143 
 Some other critics, usually made by those against the application of TP rules, is 
that some value creating activities cannot be compared as if they were performed by 
independent companies. Ana Paula Dourado, for example, points out the difficulty in 
aligning transfer pricing rules with financing activities typically connected to intra-group 
arrangements, such as cash pooling144. We have mentioned this position at Chapter 1. 
Despite this argument, we believe that, in such cases, transfer pricing rules can 
still be applied, especially if considering the transactional profit split method, which relies 
not at the existence of a very similar transaction, but more on the profit margins obtained 
by companies performing activities of a more or less comparable activities. In this case, 
a cash pooling agreement, as used in our example, could be ‘broken’ into several loan 
schemes, for instance, and, thus, the profit split method could still be reliable. 
Surely, the international community, notedly the OECD, has been working on 
improvements to the rules on transfer pricing, to better adapt them to the new schemes. 
We agree that improvements are, indeed, welcome. 
 The comments on our defense to the maintenance of the application of transfer 
pricing rules relates, therefore, to the question on ‘how much’ to attribute to this new 
virtual PE. Although is our goal to provide for a solution as more comprehensive as 
possible, we recognize that the analysis of this topic, inside the current study, is far too 
incipient and requires further efforts.  
6.2.1: Monetary thresholds for the attribution of the virtual permanent 
establishment status 
 
After determining the nature of the activities that should be taken into account for 
matters of virtual cross-border income taxation and deciding for the maintenance of 
transfer pricing rules to determine the amount of profit generated at the ‘to be verified’ 
                                                          
143 This would also represent a tax upon the inefficiency of companies, provided that a gross income tax 
would culminate in the same fiscal burden to be undertaken by companies deriving much less profit than 
others or, in a worst case scenario, even upon loss making companies, with high turnovers, for instance. 
144 Ana Paula Dourado, “Editorial: The OECD Financial Transactions Discussion Draft and BEPS Actions 
8-10.” Intertax, 46, 10 (2018), 740. 
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permanent establishment level, it is needed to determine a threshold for the actual 
attribution of the idea of ‘significant’ and, consequently, of the new PE status.  
At this second step, we believe on the need to set two orders of threshold: the first 
one would be an absolute minimum revenue obtained at the source country, simply for 
matters of lowering the demands for tax audits to be performed by tax authorities and to 
lower compliance costs for taxpayers that, ultimately, could create international market 
expansion barriers to small enterprises and start-ups. 
We also believe that this ‘absolute’ (or fixed) number for the first threshold should 
be set bilaterally by the treaty partners and that the MLI should only cover the 
implementation of the general formula (we will come back to role of the MLI in the 
procedure for implementation of our proposal in Topic 7.1).  
The reason behind this bilateral flexibility is because countries have different 
economic backgrounds and different levels of sophistication of their tax authorities. To 
set a common and standard number for this absolute threshold would be disproportional 
and would also culminate in the disregard of national and regional economic and 
administrative differences. 
Lastly, consensus would be extremely hard to archive in this proposal if a fixed 
number was selected. 
The second threshold to be analyzed would be related to the proportion of the 
global revenue of the MGC and the revenue generated at the source country (external 
benchmark approach). This would be a cumulative requirement for enabling source 
taxation, together with the previous threshold.   
Therefore, an enterprise in the source country would only trigger the virtual 
permanent establishment status if the activity developed in the source country represents 
a minimum percentual (importance) to the MGC global revenue.  
This proportionate approach is interesting because it would help to measure the 
effective participation of the source country in the construction of value for that given 
MGC and the importance of the bound (or link) established between the MGC and that 
particular jurisdiction where it acts without having a physical presence (economic 
allegiance). 
78 
 
Well, although some business can establish a huge digital (or virtual) presence in 
a given jurisdiction, sometimes, in ‘less highly digitalized business models’, for instance, 
this presence may as well be not as much significative. Our proposal seems capable of 
measuring this level of participation and translating it into a new rule of progressive 
(re)attributing (or distributing) taxing rights (Topic 6.3). 
This percentual approach can also be able to better align taxation in situations 
where a given activity is now not seen any more as preparatory or auxiliary but, at the 
same time, does not constitute something of a great proportion to the company’s revenues.  
This second threshold, therefore, would be set by the treaty partners, but, here, as 
we are dealing with percentage, we believe that it can be set around the mark of the 10% 
for companies with a global revenue up to 7.000.000, of 5% in regard to revenues from 
7.000.000 to 750.000.000 Euros145 and of 0,5% in cases the revenues exceed the previous 
threshold, creating, therefore, 3 categories, according to the illustrative table below: 
Table 1. Example of categories for minimum monetary proportional income 
Revenue Percentual of global 
income obtained at source 
jurisdiction to enable 
source taxation 
Category  
Up to 7.000.000 Euros 10% 1 
From 7.000.000 to 
750.000.000 Euros 
5% 2 
More than 750.000.000 
Euros 
0,5%146 3 
                                                          
145 The election of these number lies in reference to some documents discussed at the present study. The 
first ‘minimum’ number of 7.000.000 Euros is a reference to the European Commission, Proposal for a 
Council Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence, 
COM (2018) 147 final; 2018/0072 (CNS) (Brussels, Belgium, 2018), Art.4(3). It could well be established 
at a lower level, if used the thresholds presented at the EU DST, from which it is highlighted the number 
of 5.000.000 Euros. Surely, the use of the latter would increase the efforts of audit and compliance. Finally, 
the value of 750.000.000 Euros is a ‘political agreement’ for determining the ‘giant digital multinationals’. 
European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the common system of a digital services tax on 
revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services, COM/2018/0148 final - 2018/073 (CNS) 
(Brussels, Belgium, 2018), Art. 4. This number also appears at the BEPS Action 13, in relation to the 
obligations of the preparation of a country-by-country report. Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, Action 13 - 2015 Final 
Report (Paris, France, 2015). 
146 In cases of treaties including small jurisdictions (specially in terms of size of population) the thresholds 
could be bilaterally set into a lower level, as to harmonize with the idea that a given activity, especially 
79 
 
 
Especially regarding ‘category 2’, we understand that, perhaps, the international 
community could choose to split it into several other categories. These would increase 
tax fairness but also administrative complexity, representing another dilemma in terms of 
the necessary trade-off that the international community would have to go through when 
dealing with some points of our (or any other) proposal.147 
Surely, as there will be the need to establish a ‘global tax base’ of the given MGC, 
the rules on determining this base will have to be harmonize. We understand the difficulty 
in developing this point and we should present our ideas in this regard on Topic 7.1 below. 
So far, we can summarize the steps towards the verification of the existence of a 
virtual permanent establishment, according to our proposal, as follows: 
Figure 1. Acquisition of the virtual permanent establishment status 
Nature of the Activity 
 
Minimum revenue (at the source jurisdiction) 
                                                                                         Transfer Pricing [Profit Split Method] 
Minimum proportional revenue (source/global) 
 
Acquisition of the Virtual Permanent Establishment 
 
6.3: Allocation of taxing rights upon the profits attributed to the virtual 
permanent establishment (Simplified Formulary Apportionment Method) 
 
 After determining the amount of income attributable to the non-resident enterprise 
in the source country and, thus, establishing the formation of a virtual permanent 
establishment therein (in case the analysis lead to the process exemplified in Figure 1) 
we need to discuss where to allocate the taxing rights upon the given income. 
                                                          
when developed by giants of the digital economy, may have insignificant impact in their global revenues, 
but a fairly large impact in the local economy of the small source state. Lowering these thresholds would 
bring more balance to such cases. 
147 Alessandro Turina, “Which ‘Source Taxation’ for the Digital Economy?” Intertax, 46, 6/7 (2018), 495. 
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Before we proceed with the technicalities of our proposal, in terms of allocation 
of taxing rights, we must recognize that this new way of attributing taxing rights should 
not be extended to physical (or classic) permanent establishments, as already mentioned 
at the beginning of this Chapter. Besides the arguments already exposed, it is worth 
mentioning that, as a virtual presence can significantly vary of intensity, the physical one 
usually entails an always strong connection with the source state, with its society (in line 
with the ‘benefit principle’). 
This last argument may help us to defend that the proposal is not unproportionable 
ring-fencing and, as we are going to demonstrate, where a virtual presence is indeed large, 
the final tax result (in terms of taxing rights) would be exact the same as in regard to the 
physical PE. 
Our proposal, here, is also in line with the mentioned schedular structure of the 
international tax regime, based on the tax treaties.148 
Back to the core issue of this topic, we would like to introduce a ‘simplified 
apportionment formula’, to progressively (re)attribute the taxing rights, as follows: 
Figure 2. Simplified apportionment formula. 
Y x % of the MGC income attributable to the source state = % of the 
source income to be taxed by the source state  
(Where ‘Y’ would be a variable determined bilaterally by the treaty 
partners, in order to facilitate consensus and to enable sovereignty and 
flexibility) 
In the formula above, ‘Y’ would be the responsible for translating the 
progressivity we are talking about.  
Although we believe in setting the determination of the precise value for ‘Y’ to 
the treaty partners, some limits are recommended in order to avoid an unfair 
                                                          
148 Klaus Vogel, “The Schedular Structure of Tax Treaties.” Bulletin for International Taxation, 56, 6 
(2002). 
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(‘unbalanced’, ‘low’) share of taxing rights to the source state and an incentive to the 
development of artificial highly fragmented business enterprises (low ‘Y’ values). 
On the other hand, in cases of high values for ‘Y’, the idea of ‘significant’ would 
be mitigated and, probably, residence countries would not work towards a consensus 
implementation of the proposal. 
We must reinforce, therefore, that our rule on the attribution of taxing rights for 
the new figure of the ‘virtual permanent establishment’ is not only a new threshold for 
the attribution of source taxing rights but, together with the efforts connected to the BEPS 
implementation and the fight against artificial schemes, with the expected recovery of 
before ‘stateless income’ derived from the possibilities of avoidance of the PE status, our 
proposed rules would also be able to enlarge the taxable base of MGC in their countries 
of residence. 
The table below demonstrates the percentage of taxing rights, upon the income 
derived from a virtual PE in the source state that would fall into the competence of the 
latter. To better illustrate, assume that a given MGC derives 20% of its global revenue 
from that particular source state. 
Table 2. Example of percentual distribution of taxing rights. 
Value of 
‘Y’ 
Formula (Y x 20% = 
STR149) 
% of the income derived from the 
source state to be taxed therein (STR) 
0 0 x 20% = 0% 0% 
1 1 x 20% = 20% 20% 
2 2 x 20% = 40% 40% 
3 3 x 20% = 60% 60% 
4 4 x 20% = 80% 80% 
5 5 x 20% = 100% 100% 
6 (+) 6 x 20% = 120% 100% 
 
As the table demonstrates, of course, the maximum amount of taxing rights to be 
attributed to the source state where the virtual PE threshold was met is 100%. 
                                                          
149 STR = source income to be taxed by the source State (Source Taxing Rights). 
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In accordance to the reasons explained above, we believe that the establishment 
of values for ‘Y’ could be linked to the ‘income thresholds’ set at the 3 categories (or 
more, if decided by the treaty partners) shown in Table. 1. This will ensure a meaningful 
taxation at the source level even in cases of giant multinationals with very spread and 
fragmentated business activities.  
As an illustrative example, we believe that the following values could be set as 
parameters for the bilateral negotiations.  
Table 3. Example of values for ‘Y’ 
Value of ‘Y’ Category 
From 3 to 6 1 
From 6 to 12 2 
From 50 to 100 3 
 
The use of external benchmarking elements to determine the proportion of income 
to be taxed at the source level may create problems, as observed by Daniel Blum. 
According to that author, the adoption of such a method may lead to different tax 
treatment in a given source state to companies with the same amount of income obtained 
therein, but with very different proportions of this income in relation to their worldwide 
revenues150. 
We, to a certain extent, agree with this consideration. Nevertheless, we believe 
that the difference in the tax treatment is justified by the fact that, as defended by us, the 
MGC should be seen as a single unit and, therefore, the consideration of its global 
distribution of activities would be a reliable element to establish the connection, the 
economic allegiance and the benefit obtained by that MGC as an unit from the particular 
state. 
Otherwise, if an external benchmarking was not to be used, the author mentioned 
suggests the possibility to determine the source taxing rights by analyzing the internal 
                                                          
150 Daniel W. Blum, “Permanent Establishments and Action 1 on the Digital Economy of the OECD Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Initiative – The Nexus Criterion Redefined?” Bulletin for International 
Taxation, 69, 6/7 (2015), 319. 
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market share of the taxpayer151. We are against the use of this element, provided that it 
would walk in the opposite direction of the idea of tax certainty. Moreover, and similar 
to our argument that the creation of value by users should not be accounted because it 
does not depend on the actions directly developed by the MGC, the same applies to the 
market share, where the tax burden of a MGC would rely on the business strategies of  its 
competitors. It creates a much bigger discrimination problem than our proposal. 
Besides, as we have already mentioned, we advocate in favor of the possibility of, 
in face of a single enterprise of a MGC in a source state, of the constitution of more than 
one type of PE, when verified the respective conditions for the attribution of the different 
PE status. The rules on attribution of profits and taxing rights upon this profit, for both of 
types of PEs, should follow the respective rules of each type (physical types and the 
virtual one).152  
Our idea, therefore, would also be in line with the current ‘schedular’ structure of 
the double tax treaties and, thus, of the international business income taxation scenario. 
According to this idea, developed by Vogel153, there could be verified the existence of 
different categories of income that would be treated differently in terms of the distribution 
of the rights to tax the given incomes (exclusively or cumulatively) to the treaty 
partners154.  
The maintenance of such a structure, nevertheless, is criticized by some 
academics, some of which also advocates in favor of the extinction of direct taxes at all. 
We have already discussed our thoughts on that subject before during our study. 
The adoption of the possibility of the configuration of more than one type of PE 
should complement the efforts made in connection with BEPS Action 7155.  
                                                          
151 Daniel W. Blum, “Permanent Establishments and Action 1 on the Digital Economy of the OECD Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Initiative – The Nexus Criterion Redefined?” Bulletin for International 
Taxation, 69, 6/7 (2015), 319. 
152 The IBFD Task Force on the Digital Economy refers to that possibility as a ‘mixed PE’. See: Pasquale 
Pistone; João Félix Pinto Nogueira and Betty Andrade. “Comments submitted by The International Bureau 
of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) Task Force on the Digital Economy,” (OECD, Paris, 2019). 
153 Klaus Vogel, “The Schedular Structure of Tax Treaties.” Bulletin for International Taxation, 56, 6 
(2002). 
154 João Francisco Bianco and João Tomazella Santos. “A Change of Paradigm in International Tax Law: 
Article 7 of Tax Treaties and the Need to Resolve the Source versus Residence Dichotomy.” Bulletin for 
International Taxation, 70, 3 (2016). 
155 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of 
Permanent Establishment Status, Action 7 - 2015 Final Report (Paris, France, 2015). 
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As we have recognized, this Action was actually able to minimize the actual 
avoidance of a physical PE status, but was unable to align the source taxation in 
accordance to the value created in the source state, provided that companies are still able 
to constitute a simple low risk distributor permanent establishment (LRD PE), which 
would trigger low or no taxation in the source jurisdiction, because ‘non-physical’ 
activities would not be considered as they should.156 
With our proposal, the physical LRD PE constituted would still be taxed in 
accordance with the actual rules, but the profit related to the virtual PE associated to the 
physical LRD PE would be taxed by the new rules, increasing the source tax burden of 
that enterprise and helping to align taxation with value creation. 
This approach would also help to avoid further uncertainties and the consequent 
problems relating to the application of distributive rules. The elements already captured 
today, under the ‘physical’ rules would remain unaltered, while some of the elements not 
captured today would fall into the scope of the new rules.  
Finally, we understand that the fairly large discretionary power among the 
selection of values for ‘Y’ and for the percentual threshold of global profit obtained at 
source jurisdiction to enable source taxation will allow the existence of tax competition 
among nations. On the other hand, this would be a more ‘level playing field’ 
competition157, provided that at least a margin (minimum and maximum) could be 
provided at the MLI (what we have called a ‘general formula’). 
We are not against tax competition and we do believe that this is even an intrinsic 
element of the tax sovereignty of jurisdictions. The problem is the current harmful tax 
competition and the ‘race to the bottom’. Our solution does not promote these problems. 
                                                          
156 Torvik raises the question as whether the low-risk distributor characterization of the local permanent 
establishment would give enough taxing rights to the source state. Oddleif Trovik, “Chapter 25: The 
Allocation of Residual Profits from Unique and Valuable IP to Permanent Establishments” in Transfer 
Pricing and Intangibles – US and OECD arm’s length distribution of operating profits from IP value chains 
(IBFD Doctoral Series, 45, 2019), 9-10. 
157 The European Union appears to be in line with our differentiation, as it does not seem to be against a 
‘fair tax competition’ between Member States, provided they observe, of course, the fundamental freedoms 
and the idea of real economic activity. This discussion is well structured in: Martijn Nouwen and Peter 
Wattel, “Tax Competition and the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation” in Terra/Wattel European Tax 
Law: Volume 1 General Topics and Direct Taxation, Peter J. Wattel, Otto Marres and Hein Vermeulen 
(Deventer, the Netherlands: 7th Ed., Wolters Kluwer, 2018), 500-501. 
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Moreover, as we like to remind, flexibility and ‘space’ for a certain domestic and 
bilateral control over business income tax policy is fundamental for reaching a feasible 
solution in the short to mid-term.  
Of course, the Inclusive Framework should discuss whether to adopt a more 
standardize or a more flexible version of our proposals, depending on the level of ‘rows’ 
(or categories) countries are willing to create both for Table 1. and for Table 2.  
Another question to be answered would be the broadness of the margins for 
attributing a number to ‘Y’, both in cases of a low or high number of categories as 
discussed in the previous paragraph.  
 In a nutshell, we can conclude our ‘rationale’ scheme as follows: 
Figure 3. Acquisition of the virtual permanent establishment status and attribution of taxing 
rights. 
Minimum revenue (at the source jurisdiction) 
                                                                                         Transfer Pricing [Profit Split Method] 
Minimum proportional revenue (source/global) 
 
Acquisition of the Virtual Permanent Establishment 
 
Proportional shared taxing rights         Simplified Formulary Apportionment Method 
 
 
6.3.1: The need to establish a common base for the ‘minimum proportional 
revenue’ 
 
 For there to be an agreement as to what portion of the global income is being 
generated at the source level, the countries involved (source and residence) must 
essentially agree on how to calculate this mentioned global income. Otherwise, the 
application of the transfer pricing as suggested in this study would lead to severe 
inconsistencies. 
 Therefore, this is as issue of establishing a common tax base between the treaty 
partners in every concrete case. We see three interesting options that could, at a macro 
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perspective (looking to the entire web of DTT), be applied, depending on the case, without 
creating any new problem in terms of artificial tax schemes and harmful tax competition.  
 Beforehand, we do not believe on the feasibility of a global common corporate tax 
base, as pursued by the European Union both at the CCTB and the CCCTB proposals158. 
Even inside the context of the EU, this proposal has struggled to be adopted and, in a 
global scenario, agreement in terms like this one, for now, appears to be utopic. On the 
other direction, the IBFD Task Force on the Digital Economy suggests the creation of this 
global common tax base. 
 With that consideration, we believe that the best feasible solution (or the idea of 
the ‘second best’) is to leave for the treaty partners to bilaterally agree on a common base 
to be applied between them whenever the treaty is applicable in terms of the analysis of 
a possible virtual permanent establishment. 
 Of course, we understand that this solution may require a long time to be 
efficiently implemented, provided that bilateral (re)negotiations could take a lot of time, 
even in best-case scenarios. 
 Thus, the OECD Model Tax Convention could provide for a ‘model’ for 
determining the tax base to be applied and this ‘model’ could be included in the MLI (the 
question of whether or not to include it as a minimum standard could be raised) and 
countries would just adopt it while the bilateral negotiations are not yet undertaken. 
 The same Model Convention could yet provide for an alternative option, both in 
case the countries do not agree with the ‘model’ established or in case technicalities make 
its application excessively burdensome. Therefore, the OECD Model could establish the 
possibility, for the determination of the global income of the MGC, of the adoption of the 
same criteria for determination of profits of a resident in the source country where the 
virtual permanent establishment is being analyzed.  
 Please notice that, although the MGC may derive profit from more than one 
hundred jurisdictions, the methods to determine the proportion of the global profits 
attributable to one of the virtual permanent establishments would always be bilateral, as 
                                                          
158 European Commission, “Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base, 
Strasbourg, 25.10.2016 COM (2016) 685 final, 2016/0337 (CNS) (Strasbourg, France, 2016). European 
Commission, “Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
Strasbourg, 25.10.2016 COM (2016) 683 final 2016/0336 (CNS) (Strasbourg, France, 2016). 
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described in all the three options provided above. This is the only way possible in the 
absence of a global common standard for calculation of the tax base. 
 One important difficulty in applying our suggested methods is the need for the 
treaty partners to have access to data regarding the global profits of the MGC. This can 
be mitigated by the rapid evolution of the coverage of measures relating to automatic 
change of information between tax authorities and tax transparency in general. 
 Surely, we recognize that any of the solutions proposed by us could lead to 
distortions at the taxation at the residence level, with either a final tax result of double-
taxation or double non-taxation. This point, we understand, should be revisited by all 
stakeholders for there to be alternatives to mitigate this issue.  
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Chapter 7: Practicalities  
 
7.1: Implementation  
 
 Among the analysis of the rationale of our proposal, at Chapter 6, we have 
highlighted that both in terms of some solutions, as in terms of the adoption of ‘numbers’ 
and ‘categories’, the international community will, in practice, have to choose between 
more standardization or more flexibility. 
Depending on the choices made, which we believe should be taken inside the 
OECD Inclusive Framework, the issues on implementation would significantly vary. 
Nevertheless, we should begin with the common aspects, in terms of implementation, 
between both the more standardized and the more flexible forms. 
In our opinion, the introduction of the new virtual permanent establishment 
threshold should be made through the existing Multilateral Instrument159, thought by the 
BEPS Action 15160. This instrument is already in force161 and can, in the best feasible 
way, be effective in the introduction of new rules to the international business income 
taxation scenario. 
The main positive aspect of the MLI is that it is responsible for saving a significant 
amount of time in bilateral negotiations. Therefore, if the international community, 
namely via the work of the OECD, decides to go for a more flexible solution, this would 
still need to be negotiated between the parties and, therefore, the shape of the MLI, as it 
looks today, would need to be adapted. 
On the other hand, if a more standardized solution is to be chosen, the 
implementation through the MLI could be more effective. 
We conclude that, although we prefer the flexible solution (as defended in the 
topics ahead) we understand that, in terms of implementation, this solution requires more 
effort and time. 
                                                          
159 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax 
Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Paris, France, 2015). 
160 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to 
Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties, Action 15 - 2015 Final Report (Paris, France, 2015). 
161  
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Of course, the choice, here, would rely on the political will of the international 
community build in the near future, specially inside the discussions (and public 
consultations) at the scope of the Inclusive Framework. An interesting idea maybe to 
begin with the adoption of a more standardized approach and make it temporary, as the 
MLI itself is supposed to be and, in a second moment, to proceed with gradual bilateral 
‘adaptation’. Of course, we should take special care when implementing measures aimed 
at been temporary.  
In any case, regardless of the chosen ‘configuration’ for implementation of the 
options above, the changes would conceptually fit in the scope of Art. 2 of the Model 
Convention, as already explained, which would facilitate the procedure. 
 In the context of the European Union, our proposed solution could be 
implemented via Directive, in a scenario where the OECD and the global community 
strive to implement the measures via MLI. Of course, as we have discussed mainly in 
Chapter 5, the issues of the competence of the EU, in matters of legislating about direct 
taxation and the high requirements for political alliance in adopting new measures could 
also impose barriers in the putting forward of our proposal inside the Union. 
7.2: Enforcement and collection 
 
 The issue of an effective enforcement of the taxes to be paid to the source 
jurisdiction, where the virtual permanent establishment is located, is probably one of the 
biggest challenge to be faced by the adoption of any proposal in terms of taxing an activity 
generating revenue without any physical presence. As we have discussed in the first 
chapter, it is also a matter of tax fairness. 
 Therefore, the first instrument that comes to mind is, of course, the application of 
withholding taxes on the payments attributable to the virtual permanent establishments. 
Although this idea is strongly defended by the work of Hongler and Pistone162, we believe 
that the main problem with the ‘normal’ application of withholding taxes is that it is 
applied upon the gross income. 
                                                          
162 Hongler, Peter and Pistone, Pasquale, “Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business Income in the 
Era of Digital Economy”. IBDF Whitepapers (2015). 
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Apart from that conceptual problem in the broad application of withholding taxes, 
the challenge is even bigger when this application is simply not possible. 
 Imagine, for instance, that a company A, located in Country A, has a virtual 
permanent establishment in Country B, without any other form of permanent establish 
therein (namely, a physical PE). Assume that, in the development of a particular business, 
company C, resident in Country C, pays for company A to a digital service provided 
through the virtual permanent establishment in Country B. 
 In the described scenario, we have an activity falling under the scope of the new 
PE threshold and, for matters of exemplification, it is generating revenues above the 
minimum thresholds for the attribution of source taxing rights (to Country B), but no cash 
flow is actually passing through that jurisdiction and, therefore, a direct withholding tax 
is not possibly applicable. 
 For these cases, there should be a subsidiary form of tax collection, to substitute 
the common withholding tax application. 
 The subsidiary method could be built based on an idea of a collection made by the 
country of the payer (in our example, Country C), probably via a withholding tax, and the 
subsequent transfer of the collected value to the country of the virtual PE (Country B) 
upon the retention of a kind of ‘administrative fee’ for the collecting Country – ‘indirect 
withholding tax’. 
 Alternatively, a form of netting scheme could be developed in order to minimize 
the amount of transaction flows of collected taxes among several jurisdictions. This last 
solution, nevertheless, would require a very strong global level of cooperation, which we 
do not believe to be feasible any time soon. 
 Another idea to be further developed would be to create a form of registration for 
companies operating in a virtual form in a given country. It is not our aim to develop this 
idea, as it would require an effort outside the scope of our study. Nevertheless, a measure 
with this rationale could be able to facilitate enforcement and, if accompanied with 
compliance incentives to the taxpayers (such as the possibility of net basis taxation and 
filling tax returns) this idea could effectively work in the future. 
 As for the specific case of the European Union, an idea as above would have a 
real chance of success, provided the current level of integration of the Member States. 
91 
 
Comparable to this scheme is the ‘one stop shop’ system, applicable to the collection and 
distribution of VAT, considered to be an efficacious mechanism. 
 In any case, considering our comments above, we still believe that withholding 
taxes, in comparison to equalization levy or small turnover taxes should be preferred.163 
 
7.3: Recognition of losses  
 
 The possibility of the recognition of losses, in our point of view, lies closely 
related to the exercise of a net taxation upon the virtual activities under the scope of our 
proposal. Therefore, it appears to be a hard task to conciliate a ‘normal’ gross base 
taxation via withholding taxes and the recognition of losses. 
 Perhaps, if the virtual permanent establishment is connected to a physical one, the 
losses of the first could be offset with the income of the latter, even with an application 
of gross withholding taxes in the virtual PE and the regular net income tax of the physical 
PE. This still would not completely work if the losses of the first are considerably higher 
than the income of the latter. 
 Moreover, in the case where no physical PE relates to the virtual PE in analysis, 
this offset would simply not be possible. 
 The way in which losses of virtual permanent establishments would be recognized 
is if our ‘registration proposal’ is put forward. Surely, the technicalities of this procedure 
would have to be debated. This discussion will not be included in the present study. 
Again, this would be reasonably easier to achieve inside the European Union, as 
the level of integration of the Member States could facilitate the implementation of a 
cross-border system for the recognition of losses in virtual permanent establishments, as 
it is fundamental for the development of a free internal market. 
                                                          
163 Yariv Brauner, “Editorial: Taxing the Digital Economy Post-BEPS, Seriously”. Intertax, 46, 6/7 (2018), 
462. Also, Roland Ismer and Christoph Jescheck, “Debate: Taxes on Digital Services and the Substantive 
Scope of Application of Tax Treaties: Pushing the Boundaries of Article 2 of the OECD Model?” Intertax, 
46, 6/7 (2018), 573. 
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Furthermore, it is important to highlight that Member States have several 
restrictions regarding the application of gross withholding taxes, such as in cases covered 
by the Interest and Royalties Directive.164 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
164 European Parliament and the European Council, “Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a 
common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments made between associated 
companies of different Member States”. 
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Chapter 8: Implications 
 
Several should be the implications of the adoption of our proposal and we should 
discuss, in more specific terms, these implications upon the principles of the Ottawa 
Framework (Topic 8.1); upon the tax administrations (Topic 8.2) and upon the taxpayers 
(Topic 8.3). Most likely, this Chapter will not be able to discuss all the possible 
implications, as it would take another full dissertation. Nevertheless, we hope to achieve 
a comprehensive analysis. 
 Therefore, we start with some general commentaries. 
 The first one is that we believe that, as a consequence of the implementation of 
our proposal, together with the successful implementation of the Actions of the BEPS 
Action Plan, there should be no need to the parallel adoption of any of the proposals under 
the OECD ‘Pillar Two’, as well as any similar measures, like the DST EU proposal. We 
have already discussed these proposals at the second part of this study. 
 Another important implication relates to the ‘incentive vs. disincentive’ of the 
development of the digital economy and, with it, with the development of new (and more 
efficient) technologies and business models. 
Politically, the international community (and, strongly, the European Union as 
well) demonstrates a will to enhance the development of the digital economy, 
nevertheless, in parallel, both this international community and the countries, 
domestically, are discussing several proposals to impose a higher tax burden upon the 
development of such activities. Our proposal does not create a barrier to the development 
of the digital economy. 
Besides the analysis of these two main implications, we are aware, as already 
mentioned during the study, that certain trade-offs will have to be made and the 
international community will have to weigh the consequences of the choices made, 
specially inside the scope of our proposal. 
We should now take a deeper look at the implications in relation to the principles 
of the Ottawa Framework, which are also good examples of the just mentioned trade-offs. 
8.1: Upon principles of the Ottawa Framework 
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As mentioned in Topic 6.2 above, the use of transfer pricing methods, namely the 
‘profit split method’ prevents the incidence of taxes upon activities that cannot be measure 
(or seen) between independent parties, such as the user participation or contribution. 
 To actually impose a tax upon an attributable value in the scope of this category 
of activities would represent an ‘extra-fiscal’ character of the income tax in question, as 
it would act as an element in favor of the discouragement of the performance of business 
in more digitalized ways. 
 Ultimately, and contradictious enough, this would go in a totally opposite 
direction in regard to what countries are current engaged in terms of shaping social and 
economic behavior by changes in taxes. The imposition of higher tax burdens on 
unhealthy food or beverage products and in non-sustainable environment activities are 
examples of what we defend. 
 The application of transfer pricing methods (and the arm’s length principle) at the 
moment of analyzing the amount of profits (or value) to attribute to the virtual permanent 
establishment ensures, at the best way viable, a level playing field between different 
business models (more or less digitalized). Therefore, less economic distortions would be 
likely to emerge and, consequently, less deadweight loss would be perceived.  
 Translating these considerations into the ‘language’ of the Ottawa Framework, it 
seems clear to us that the use, at this stage, of the TP rules would ensure the ‘neutrality’ 
searched by the OECD and the global community.  
 Moreover, as founded on feasible choices, related to the expressed political will 
of most countries and on compromising shares of taxing rights, based on our proportional 
attribution formula, we believe that the new ‘virtual permanent establishment’ could work 
efficiently.  
 Combined with relatively simple formulas, still able to accommodate the 
differences exiting inside the spectrum of taxpayers, our solution could bring more 
certainty to both tax authorities and taxpayers, also contributing to the mentioned 
effectiveness of the system. 
 Finally, we have also developed a flexible enough solution. At first, because 
although it is supposed to be a global solution, it would still adapt to the economic and 
political regional and national differences, once again, also enabling consensus. Secondly, 
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because it is not designed to tackle very particular business models. It is rather a 
comprehensive solution that we believe could adapt to the development of the digital 
economy and to new business models to come. 
8.2: Upon tax administrations and taxpayers 
 
 As a natural consequence of the impacts of our proposed solution in the 
framework of the Ottawa principles, we believe that the implications for both taxpayers 
and tax administrations would be positive. Of course, as mentioned during our studies, 
trade-offs will inevitably happen. 
 With the global implementation of our solution, both tax administrations and 
taxpayers would benefit from more certainty, simplicity and efficient, which would 
contribute both for the safeguard of the collection of income taxes, from the State 
perspective, as for the possibility to better plan the international tax burden, for MGC, 
which lower the costs of doing business abroad and acts as an incentive to the 
development of the digital economy. 
 Moreover, we also believe that our proposal could help decreasing the number of 
tax claims (disputes), which ultimately benefits all stakeholders.  
 Surely, on the other side, both tax administrations and taxpayers would have initial 
extra costs of compliance and audit, provided that the global implementation of our 
solution (or of most of the others) should require a stronger international cooperation and 
the sharing of documents, as accountings documents, for instance. 
 Finally, we believe that the trade-offs in evidence still work in favor of all 
stakeholders, as debated in this topic.  
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Conclusions 
 
 Throughout this study, we could properly identify the nature of the tax challenges 
of the digital economy. Interestingly, we were also able to perceive that tax scholars are 
living in exiting times, provided the intense (and rapidly) changes occurring in the system 
for international business income taxation. 
 In this context, several proposals to tackle the tax challenges of the digitalization 
of the economy, namely the need to prevent BEPS and to (re)think the global distribution 
(or attribution) of taxing rights, were debated. We dedicated a special part of this work to 
specifically discuss the proposals developed by the OECD and the EU, with the critical 
confrontation of these proposals with the input from several scholars. 
 The relatively wide range of different proposals and the lack of an adopted strategy 
revel space for creativity and innovation in presenting new ideas. Nevertheless, as 
debated, these new ideas must be politically accepted and technically feasible. 
 With that in mind, there was proposed a new virtual permanent establishment 
threshold, able to capture the non-physical activities of multinational group of companies 
and to realign the distribution of the tax revenue among residence and source States. 
 Importantly, we also believe that our proposed solution was able to accommodate 
the changes needed without been disproportionately ring-fencing165, differently, as 
discussed, from the user participation proposal (OECD) or the DST proposal, from the 
EU. Although we do not advocate in favor of the extension of the new rules to the existing 
physical PE, we were able to demonstrate that, whenever the digital presence represents 
a large enough participation of the MGC at the source State, the final tax result (fiscal 
burden and competent country) would be the same as of the ‘regular’ PE. 
 Moreover, the proposed solution was included in the current framework for 
international business income taxation, which we believe to be of fundamental 
importance, provided the political discourse both at the OECD and the EU and the 
facilitation in matters of implementation, given its compatibility with the current Art.2 od 
the OECD Model Convention. 
                                                          
165 Michael P. Devereux and John Vella, “Debate: Implications of Digitalization for International Corporate 
Tax Reform.” Intertax, 46, 6/7 (2018), 550. 
97 
 
Therefore, we opted for the maintenance of the application of income taxes and 
for a nexus-based solution, as most of the ongoing proposals. In a more detailed way, we 
also advocated in favor of the maintenance of the current nexus: ‘residence’; ‘source’ and 
‘permanent establishment’. Most of the discussed proposals, nevertheless, either confused 
the meanings of ‘source’ and ‘market’ jurisdiction or deliberately shifted the nexus from 
the first to the latter. Some other stakeholders, for instance, are against the use of the idea 
of permanent establishment. 
  Our proposal also defended the maintenance of the use of transfer pricing and the 
arm’s length principle for the attribution (or definition) of the profits generated at the new 
virtual permanent establishment level. In this regard, different opinions were debated and 
we have recognized the need to there to be some changes and adaptations at the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, especially in terms of intra-group financial transactions, as 
highlighted by Ana Paula Dourado. 
 Besides, we have detailed the technicalities of a system to proportionately attribute 
taxing rights for both the source and the residence country, after the determination of the 
profits attributable to the new PE. In this sense, two minimum monetary thresholds were 
created in order to comply with the principle of simplicity and to lower the need (and 
expenses related) of tax audits and compliance, from the taxpayer side. The first was an 
absolute minimum revenue threshold, while the second measured the proportion of profits 
attributable to the ‘to be verified’ PE and the global profits of the MGC. 
 In the scope of the mentioned thresholds, we have set different categories in order 
to accommodate possible bilateral or regional variations, to accommodate the difference 
in the economic background of countries and to facilitate flexibility and consensus. 
Nevertheless, we pointed for the possibility of, especially in the future, for there to be a 
more standardized adoption of our proposal. 
We also concluded that it would enable a global application of the proposal and 
that, with the possible variations, tax competition would keep existing. On the other hand, 
aligned with the development in the implementation of the outcomes of the BEPS project, 
our solution would lead to a fair tax competition166, based on real economic activity and 
                                                          
166 Maarten de Wilde, “Tax Competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB Directive a Solution?” 
Erasmus Law Review, 24, 1 (2014), 26. 
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leading space for tax sovereignty167 and for the possibilities of countries to exercise some 
control over their income tax policy. 
 The studies also analyzed the practicalities of the adoption of such a solution, in 
terms of implementation, enforcement and collection and the recognition of losses 
attributable to the virtual permanent establishment. 
Moreover, the proposed solution showed a comprehensive approach to the 
challenges faced and provided both the theoretical and practical grounds for its successful 
implementation (globally, via the MLI). We, on the other hand, recognize the need to 
advance in technical studies to complement our efforts in matters, for instance, of solving 
the ‘source conundrum’ issue.  
Finally, these studies debated all the main questions raised, for instance, at the 
special issues of Intertax168, from 2018 and 2019, as well as from the special issue of the 
Bulletin for International Taxation, from 2018, all in relation to the subject of ‘taxing the 
digital economy’. We have also benefited from the analysis of the most updated 
documents from both the OECD and the EU and from the participation in several 
conferences relating to the subject, all around Europe. 
With these final considerations, we hope our solution could be able to add to the 
discussions on the international community, especially in the scope of the OECD and the 
EU and that it can, somehow, contribute to the achievement of a ‘consensus based’ global 
solution, by the first, until the end of 2020, when the Organization should release a final 
document on the subject. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
167 Peter Hongler and Pasquale Pistone, “Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business Income in the 
Era of Digital Economy.” IBDF Whitepapers (2015), 2. 
168 See: Ana Paula Dourado, “Editorial: Is There a Light at the End of the Tunnel of the International Tax 
System?” Intertax, 46, 8/9 (2018), 607-609.  
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